Bad news for Erdoğan?

08.02.2008
Today's Zaman, Turkey
ALI H. ASLAN

Bad news for Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Given the results of the "super Tuesday" primaries in the US, Barack Obama, whom Erdoğan lashed out at after he promised to acknowledge the so-called "Armenian genocide," has never been so close to winning the Democratic Party's nomination for the 2008 presidential elections.

Erdoğan harshly criticized Senator Obama, depicting him as an "acemi" (rookie) politician. Many people fall into the trap of underestimating others. As an underestimated politician who has proven to be the most durable "black" leader in the "white-dominated" Republic of Turkey, Erdoğan should have known this more than anyone else. Furthermore, he himself was not more experienced than Obama in government affairs and he was only two years older than Obama (46) when he became prime minister with the Turkish general elections in 2002. And I'm telling you, the chances for Obama to be the next president of the US are no less favorable than Erdoğan's 2002 bid. The Clintons, who also seem to have underestimated him, should nowadays be grappling with this fact more than anyone else.

Obama made a strong start by winning the Iowa caucus. The Clinton camp became increasingly nervous after Obama stole the normally Clinton-loyal black Americans in South Carolina. But it wasn't until this Tuesday that alarm bells started to ring for Clinton. Once considered the obvious frontrunner in the Democratic race, Senator Clinton now feels the breath of Obama on her neck.

Elections in the first five states granted Clinton 51 percent more delegates than Obama. In the aftermath of Super Tuesday, however, delegate tallies are almost even or only slightly in favor of Clinton according to varying counts due to the confusing calculation methods of the Democratic primaries. Obama has the psychological edge since he won five more states than Clinton, whereas the big enchilada, California, went to Hillary.

There is an even more dramatic comparison in their respective monetary situations. Who would expect an "underdog" candidate like Obama to surpass Clinton in terms of campaign funds? Senator Clinton, whose campaign ran out of money, had to borrow $5 million from her personal account. Obama, on the other hand, enjoys $32 million raised in January alone, compared to Hillary's $13.5 million.

Everybody knows money talks in politics (although perhaps not as much as Republican presidential hopeful Mitt Romney, who has spent millions from his own fortune so far, has counted on). Vice versa, talk generates money (though not necessarily as much as former preacher Mike Huckabee might have wished for). Obviously, Obama has proven very successful in transforming his speaking abilities into campaign funds. His debate performance may not be extraordinary, but he can definitely score high points when he addresses crowds. The wider American public probably first got acquainted with Obama during his impressive nationally televised victory speech in Iowa. And it should be no surprise that he was able to garner increasing numbers of young voters, who constitute the backbone of his political organization.

It looks like the more people get to know Obama, the more likely they are to vote for him. So time is on Obama's side in this unusually long intra-party race. The Clinton campaign is far from being dead. But eventually we might very well find ourselves in a situation where we will be talking more about White House foreign policy under Obama's command. If only, of course, he also beats the Republican candidate. That person seems to be Senator John McCain, given his lead over the remaining two contenders, Romney and Huckabee, which is mathematically almost impossible to beat.

Speaking of mathematics, it's almost a certainty that Clinton, Obama or McCain is going to be the next US president. All of them are multilateralists, and that's good for the US and for the world. I'm sure their counterparts in Ankara, no matter how enraged they might be at times, will do their best to not reduce Turkey's relations with the US to issues like the debate over Armenian allegations of genocide. They would expect the same from the American side. After all, even the US cannot afford a "with us or against us" mantra on particular policy topics. How can Turkey do so?

a.aslan@todayszaman.com

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

U.S.-Turkey-Azerbaijan: a Strategic Partnership

December 10, 2007
US Department of State, DC

Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary European and Eurasian Affairs

Remarks to the Center for Eurasian Policy conference on "The Azerbaijan-Turkey-U.S. Relations and Its importance for Eurasia"

Mayflower Hotel, Washington, DC
December 10, 2007
As Prepared for Delivery

Good morning, and thank you, Mr. Cetin, for your kind words. And Salaam and merhaba to all of you here and participating from overseas.

I’m told that the name Azerbaijan comes from the Old Persian for “Land of Fire,” a reference supposedly to Azerbaijan’s famous petroleum deposits.

The link between the nation and energy does neatly capture the way many look at Azerbaijan.

But there is another theory that the name refers to bonfires lit by the Zoroastrian high priests of this ancient country. I prefer that theory of the origin of the name Azerbaijan, because it roots the nation in ancient culture, and it is culture, not resources, that makes civilizations.

Nations need resources, but traditions and values are deeper ingredients of successful nationhood. America looks at Azerbaijan in the deeper sense.

The United States and Europe are of course large consumers of foreign energy, and we are interested in a free and open market for all commodities, especially strategic ones, and I will speak to that. But U.S. interests in partnership with Azerbaijan are broader.

We have a stake in the spread of the rule of law and democracy, the stability that results over time from their consolidation, and an open-trading system. And our relations with Turkey are similarly broad.

The three of us—Azerbaijan, Turkey and the United States—can forge a strategic partnership that will benefit us all, and in turn benefit the region.

Turkey’s example as a secular democracy with a Muslim-majority population can inspire reformers in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and broader Middle East who seek the same political freedom, prosperity, and stability that Turkish citizens increasingly enjoy.

America’s grand strategy for post-communist Europe since 1989 has rested on a deceptively simple principle: America’s interests are best served when the countries which liberated themselves from Soviet control are free and empowered to fulfill their own destiny by pursuing their own reforms.

The United States does not view the countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia instrumentally. Rather, we are convinced that Azerbaijan’s success as a nation – free and at peace at home, at peace in its region – is in our long-term interest.

I would like to make three points to illustrate how we apply this overall approach to Azerbaijan in particular and what Turkish-Azerbaijani-U.S. strategic partnership means.

· First, by succeeding as a democracy over time and building modern national institutions, again over time, Azerbaijan can be a stronger nation and more important strategic partner.

· The second point concerns the Turkish-Azerbaijani-U.S. energy partnership: through this partnership, we hope Azerbaijan can find resources for building its state at home and peace and security in its region.

· The third point includes the impact we hope U.S.-Turkey-Azerbaijan strategic cooperation will have on the region that stretches from the Black Sea to China.

Azerbaijan’s Democracy and Nationhood

Let us acknowledge and applaud what Azerbaijan has achieved since regaining its independence in 1991. It managed the immediate post-Soviet transition successfully. It stabilized itself and developed cooperative relations with Russia. Today, it is helping Iraqis and Afghans retain their freedom, in partnership with the United States.

Nagorno-Karabakh remains an unresolved and dangerous problem. But even given this, we should affirm that President Heydar Aliyev achieved a great deal in successfully creating a viable and sovereign state.

The question now is what kind of state Azerbaijan will become. And the that question is not yet answered.

Will Azerbaijan continue a successful path of national development? It can do so only if it creates 21st century institutions essential for a modern state. These include an independent legislature, an independent banking system; an impartial judiciary free of political control; independent, functioning markets; an independent media, and more. This is the challenge of President Ilham Aliyev.

Notice the operative word: independent. Checks and balances are necessary if a government is going to correct course. And checks and balances only exist when institutions act without fear of retribution.

Freedom in this sense is not a luxury that one looks to achieve as an afterthought. Democracy is not simply the holding of elections. The 21st century faces many challenges—terrorism and ideological radicalization, the proliferation of unconventional weapons, and weak and corrupt governance among them. The response to these problems will be found through the rule of law, through governments that rule justly and accountably, through free markets and the institutions that keep them honest.

And Azerbaijan’s achievements in this context are mixed. The opposition has been marginalized, and while I know there are outstanding individuals in parliament—one with us today— the legislature needs to play its role in governing the country and not be simply a transition belt for the government. Courts, too, need to function as courts.

More importantly, we are deeply disturbed by the continued and recently growing pressure on media, including the arrests of journalists. I was dismayed to learn of the arrest of an RFE/RL correspondent – Nasibov -- in Azerbaijan late last week under charges of “criminal libel.” I understand that the Nakhichivan prosecutor has dropped the most severe charges; if true, I welcome it. But I also understand that Mr. Nasibov has been given a year’s probation for what appears to be no more than him doing his job. Moreover, this latest arrest follows a disturbing pattern of pressure on independent journalists. I regret to say that we appear to be witnessing a deterioration of media freedom in Azerbaijan. This is not good news for Azerbaijan or our relations.

We all witnessed the difficulties Georgia encountered when it closed a major television station. Our message to our Georgian friends was the same as my message to you: if the media are not free, neither is the nation. Strong countries have free media. The media has a responsibility to maintain professional standards, but arrests are not the way to improve media.

These blunt words may not meet with an enthusiastic reaction from some here. They are not intended to elicit one. But let me add that America is far from perfect, and we do not hold ourselves above criticism. Nor does Azerbaijan need look to the U.S. as the sole available democratic model. There are other examples.

Turkey is itself deepening its democracy and gradually developing the practices and institutions of secular democracy with a Muslim-majority population. Turkish democracy has faced setbacks in the past and faced a test this past spring and summer, but there is no doubt that the main trend in Turkey over the past generation has been profoundly democratic, and this year Turkish democracy demonstrated its strength through the last elections that provided a fair chance for the nation’s will to make itself known and respected.

Azerbaijan could follow Turkey’s example, even as Turkey conducts its own debates about improving journalistic freedoms and eliminating taboos that have no place in a confident, modern nation. Again, strong nations do not arrest their journalists and silence their critics.

Azerbaijan might consider that U.S.-Turkish relations are based on shared values as much as shared interests.

By succeeding as a secular democracy, Azerbaijan can similarly elevate its strategic importance, as Turkey has done. This process, to be realistic, takes time. If Azerbaijan over time opens itself up, deepens its institutions, opens its economy, the rest of its democracy will follow and its independence and sovereignty will have stronger foundations, as will our partnership.

Energy Partnership

The longer term impact of energy development will also be a factor in Azerbaijan’s success in developing independent institutions.

Azerbaijan needs to make its oil and gas deposits become a blessing and national asset, and not a source of fast wealth and long-term instability. We all know of petro-dictatorships abound in the world. Theories why also abound, and they usually revolve around how oil and gas revenues free leaders from checks and balances. Sudden wealth unchecked by strong, honest institutions to handle it can fatten a small group of well-placed leaders rather than strengthen a nation. In such cases, massive amounts of petro-money lead to corruption, mis-governance, economic distortions and, ultimately, political and social instability.

The answer lies in transparent institutions and open markets, independent of monopolies and the distortions they bring.

Azerbaijan has taken some of the right steps already. In 1994, President Haydar Aliyev made a bold decision to open Azerbaijan’s energy sector in the Caspian Sea to international investors.

This opening, coupled with the Baku-Supsa and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipelines and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, aimed to cement Azerbaijan’s place in Europe, in close cooperation with Turkey and the United States.

This vision was then shared and amplified by then-President Demirel of Turkey. Working with Azerbaijani President Aliyev, Azebaijani Energy Minister Natiq Aliyev, Azerbaijani Vice Speaker Aleskherov, and Turkish Energy Minister Guler, these plans have gone forward to establish a new generation of energy infrastructure in a Southern Corridor that will help Europe diversify its energy supplies by relying on Azerbaijani, and Caspian energy more generally, eventually delivered via Turkey. It is hardly surprising that all these men are either here or are addressing this conference via video.

I also want to note the success of the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan as a success. The establishment and functioning of this fund show that Azerbaijan’s leadership is aware of and addressing the pitfalls of the “Oil Trap.”

Azerbaijan has a strategic importance as an alternative supplier of natural gas to Europe. It is emerging as a giant producer of natural gas, in addition to the oil that fills the landmark BTC pipeline. Azerbaijan’s gas reserves should be sufficient to launch—and perhaps complete—a new generation of natural gas pipelines that will link Southern and Central Europe with the Caspian Basin via Turkey, providing several of our European Allies with a viable alternative to a monopoly transport system and a closed investment climate.

The opening of energy development and end to closed, monopolistic transport systems will tend to reduce corruption, if matched by development of institutions to see to it that energy wealth benefits the nation: independent, well-regulated and un-politicized banks; and accountability for the energy resources.

U.S.-Turkey-Azerbaijan Cooperation in the Region

Azerbaijan’s successful development at home and support for open energy markets should go hand-in-hand and successful U.S.-Turkey-Azerbaijan strategic cooperation directed at the surrounding region.

We three countries at this conference know that our tripartite relationship is a major strategic factor for the region. Turkey is an old friend and ally of ours, and we have been through many a crisis together. Our friendship transcends the state-to-state, government-to-government levels and includes individuals. I have friends at this conference, and they have a friend in me.

Let me say how pleased I am that, at long last, our cooperation against the PKK terrorist organization is at a new phase and yielding concrete results.

But aside from our interests in each other, we three can also do a lot together externally, impacting not just the South Caucasus but also the vast land that stretches on the other side of the Caspian.

The title of your conference is “The Azerbaijan-Turkey-U.S. Relationship and its importance to Eurasia” and I find that apt. The three of us should do all we can to help this region expand its strategic horizons and its political and economic freedoms. Achieving this would raise our tripartite relationship to a higher strategic level.

The South Caucasus and Central Asia emerged from the Soviet Union, but have yet to find their place in the wider world.

A Turkey and Azerbaijan as it goes in the right direction will lead these countries to a destination of peace and prosperity, and I agree with Ambassador Sensoy about Turkey’s soft power. We want a Central Asia open to and engaged the world as a subject in its own right, not an object.

In saying this, let me add that the United States does not regard itself in a zero-sum game against any other country. To be blunt and specific: Russia will be a major factor in this region; it is neither wise nor possible for the United States to pit itself against Russia as an objective of our policies. Rather, in our vision of an open region, there is room for all nations to develop relations with Central Asia and the South Caucasus, as this region finds its own way in the world in its new independence and sovereignty. We will defend and advance this vision vigorously.

One huge benefit for the region, and a huge achievement for the US-Azerbaijan-Turkey partnership, is the physical and economic manifestation of the development of a Southern Corridor to Europe for natural gas. This will require the US, Azerbaijan, and Turkey to work together to attract gas from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. The result would be a far stronger basis of long-term strategic openness for the region and its connection to the west.

Our partnership can have a tremendous impact beyond the former Soviet empire. A democratic, developing, prosperous, and stable Azerbaijan will provide an example to inspire aspiring reformers in Iran, whose 17 million ethnic Azeris comprise one-quarter of Iran’s population.

In order for this vision, an important one, to materialize, Azerbaijan is going to need to enact the political reforms I referred to. It will also need to resolve its outstanding issue with Armenia.

The South Caucasus cannot achieve its full potential in the absence of a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement. As long as Armenia remains isolated in its region, a common vision of prosperity and freedom, and therefore stability, will not be attainable. It is time to wrap up agreement on the Basic Principles of a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement.

Azerbaijan’s success can be as critical for Central Asia as was Poland’s success was 15 years ago to Central Europe.

But to succeed, Azerbaijan will have to:

· Deepen its institutions as a secular democracy, something that will only elevate Azerbaijan’s strategic importance; and

· Do all it can to ensure transparency in its energy markets.

If it does make reforms in these areas, the U.S.-Turkey-Azerbaijan relationship can help shape the strategic evolution of the vast region from the Black Sea to China and to advance its sovereign and independent place in the wider world.

Azerbaijan’s future will be as bright as it makes it. Turkey, given its geographic position and NATO membership, is a natural gateway for Azerbaijan to the Euro-Atlantic family. Just as Turkey is deepening its democratic reforms to sustain its EU accession ambitions, so must Azerbaijan advance democratic reform to bolster its ties with Euro-Atlantic institutions.

Those bright lights that caught the eyes of Ancient Persians should not be allowed to die down.

Thank you very much for your attention and for organizing this conference.

Released on December 10, 2007

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

Turkey: From Bloody Birth to Power Broker

21 Nov. 2007
Antiwar.com, CA
by Ann Berg

According to legend, its flag sprang from the reflection of a star and the crescent moon in a pool of native warriors' blood. The national anthem exults, "Martyrs would gush out were one to squeeze the soil!" Of all the Muslim countries created after World War I, only Turkey succeeded in expelling Western occupiers to achieve a modern statehood that many consider miraculous. Today, its treatment by the U.S. as a backwater pawn has roused the nation to defiance: 86 percent of all Turks now hold a negative view of America.

Ruled by Muslim Turks since 1453, the Ottoman Empire entered a long period of decline during the 19th century. Shrinking in territories and burdened with war debt, it defaulted on its international loans in 1875, drawing France and Britain to Constantinople – present-day Istanbul – to collect repayment from the Ottoman treasury. When the sick man of Europe crumbled during World War I, world leaders carved it into a dozen pieces under the 1920 Treaty of Sevres and subsequently refined the borders under the Sykes-Picot agreement. A mandate system that allowed the newly formed entities varying degrees of independence delineated five states: Britain claimed Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan (now Jordan), while France took Syria and Lebanon.

Because the Entente powers considered the Anatolian Turks incapable of self-rule, they parceled the strategic coastal areas among the victors. The British, the French, and the Italians sent occupation forces to Constantinople, and Greece, staunchly backed by Britain, took over the Aegean port of Smyrna (Izmir). Its goal was to restore Constantinople – the seat of the Greek-speaking Christian empire for a millennium – to its Byzantine glory. And finally, to the east, the Bolsheviks were eager to stamp a communist footprint on this strategic landmass. Strapped for foreign exchange, Russia needed unencumbered transit from the Black Sea through the Dardanelles to export its wheat surplus and newly discovered crude oil.

Against this backdrop, by 1922, the Turks drove out the Greeks (who had advanced into the central plateau with the goal of capturing the newly declared capital of Ankara), expelled the European powers, and reclaimed large territories to the east from Armenia. The Turkish-Greco war still lingers bitterly. Historical records blame the Greeks for a scorched-earth policy as they were driven out of Smyrna, while others depict the Turks burning the Greek and Armenian Christian villages to the ground. Witnesses say that 75 percent of Smyrna was destroyed. Standing on the waterfront of the ancient Mediterranean port, I asked a Turkish friend what happened during the postwar deportation of the remaining Greek and Armenian communities, and he quietly told me, "The boats came and they went."

By 1923, all Western forces had demobilized. Turkey established most of its modern-day borders under the Treaty of Lausanne. Although the U.S. had stayed out of the Turkish wars, Turkey's success at Lausanne caused the U.S. ambassador to Germany to proclaim, "Christian civilization was crucified … and the Stars and Stripes were trailed in the mire in the interest of a group of oil speculators."

Kemalism

Anyone visiting the capital city of Ankara is struck by the ubiquitous presence of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the modern Turkish state. His likeness appears in every visual form imaginable, gracing photographs, paintings, busts, masks, bas-reliefs, and statues. On the main thoroughfare, his face gazes out at the street procession from gigantic Orwellian tapestries unfurled from the tops of buildings. The symbolism is forceful – it serves the citizenry as a permanent reminder of Turkey's struggle for independence 84 years ago (Oct. 29) and fuses the state and the man into an enduring mythological unity.

Ataturk's life was a one-man revolution of breathtaking proportions. Officially, he is credited with the establishment of a modern, Western-leaning republic that included a civil code and language reform, universal education, equal inheritance and voting rights for women, and the abolition of the Caliphate, as well as industrial projects, including railway development and state-run manufacturing. Accounts of his personal life are dizzying: war hero, president (Time dubbed him "dictator"), educator, arts patron, father of seven adopted daughters – all of which he managed while drinking himself to death by age 57. But beneath the glowing biography is a darker story of Kemalism. While espousing republican principles and secularism, the doctrine sought to unify Turkey as one culture and one language by forced assimilation. The new republic outlawed mystical and ecstatic orders such as Sufism and denied the Kurds – a minority accused of deviant worship and orgiastic sexual practices – basic expression of culture and language. As early as 1925, uprisings were repressed with bombardment, slaying, and hanging. Beneath the philosophy of rational enlightenment lay brutal repression and a strong dose of militarism.

After World War II

Since the Korean War and following Turkey's entry into NATO (never mind that it is nowhere near the Atlantic), the U.S. has assumed Turkey would dutifully bow to America's dictates. But Turkey – boosted by its booming economy and its perception of the U.S. as a clumsy brute at its doorstep – is experiencing a resurgence of nationalism. Its parliamentary rejection in 2003 of the coalition's plan to stage the Iraq invasion through Turkish territory and its embrace of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan – a devout Muslim – have caught the U.S. completely flatfooted. The U.S. government fails to see that its transformative design for the region and Turkey's desire for border integrity and economic expansion are on a collision course.

On the economic front, Turkey, which has an energy deficit, envisions becoming an energy transit hub. Its southeastern port of Ceyhan is the terminus for one pipeline originating from the Caspian Sea port Baku (BTC) and another from Kirkuk, Iraq. Turkey projects earning several hundred million dollars in transit fees per year from these two pipelines and sees the restive Kurdish region as a threat to its plans. It has announced intentions to secure a long-term supply contract with Kirkuk and strongly opposes Kurdish plans to incorporate the city (once claimed by Turkey after WWI) into the semi-autonomous northern Iraqi region. Similarly, Turkey plans to expand trade with Iran, notwithstanding U.S. disapproval. According to the Turkish press, trade has grown from $2.3 billion to $6.7 billion between 2003 and 2006, and the two countries have signed a preferential trade pact on a series of goods. Iran (along with Russia) supplies Turkey its gas needs, which have been growing in pace with the economy.

On the political side, Ankara and Tehran progressively share a cause that unites them – a "war on terror" against the PKK and its Iranian arm, PJAK. For Turkey, the growing attacks by the PKK against Turkish forces are not just acts of terrorism (the U.S. view), but the embodiment of the separatist movement that wants to chip off its southeastern region. Turkey sees duplicity in America's role: the U.S. condemns the PKK, but not PJAK – finding the latter useful for provoking Iran. Hence, Turks overwhelmingly support the military crossing the border – not just to crush the rebels but to commit an act of defiance against the superpower.

As it begins to play a role of regional political power broker, Turkey openly bristles at American sermonizing and patronizing, especially since it correctly warned the U.S. how instability would ripple through the whole region following the Iraq invasion. As a country that criminalizes "insults to Turkishness," it views the recent U.S. congressional effort to recognize as genocide the Ottoman Turks' massacre of Armenians in 1915 to be an irreparable blow to its alliance with the U.S. Fiercely proud of its revolutionary birth and protective of its sovereign borders, the rising crescent will increasingly exert its own will in the region. For the U.S., that means one more miscalculation in a bloody field of failures.

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

AHI and ANCA Issue Joint Statement on Senate Resolution Regarding U.S.-Turkey Relations

30 OLctober 2007
Hellenic News of America, PA

WASHINGTON, DC – Executive Director Nick Larigakis issued a joint statement today with Aram Hamparian Executive Director for the Armenian National Committee, to members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarding the introduction by Senators Gordon Smith (R-OR) and Robert Byrd (D-WV) of S.Res. 358 regarding U.S.-Turkey relations.

The statement says:

The resolution introduced by Senators Smith and Byrd neither serves U.S. interests nor advances American values by sugarcoating Turkey�s record or by ignoring serious tensions in the U.S.-Turkey bilateral relationship.

Any legislation that the Congress considers on this issue should clearly and prominently address Turkey�s threats to invade and destabilize northern Iraq, its immoral and heavy-handed threats against the recognition of the Armenian Genocide, military occupation of Cyprus, continued airspace violations of Greek-sovereign airspace over the Aegean, blockade of Armenia, mistreatment of the Kurds, and restrictions on the religious freedom of the Ecumenical Patriarch and other Christian leaders.

Below is a copy of S.Res. 358 regarding U.S.-Turkish relations.

SENATE RESOLUTION 358—EXPRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY

S.Res. 358

Mr. SMITH (for himself and Mr. Byrd) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

Whereas the United States and Turkey share common ideals and a clear vision for the 21st century, in which freedom and democracy are the foundation of peace, prosperity, and security;

Whereas Turkey is a strong example of a predominantly Muslim country with a true representative democratic government;
Whereas for more than 50 years a strategic partnership has existed between the United States and Turkey, both bilaterally and through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which has been of enormous political, economic, cultural, and strategic benefit to both countries;

Whereas the Government of Turkey has demonstrated its opposition to terrorism throughout the world, and has called for the international community to unite against this threat;

Whereas Turkey maintains an important bilateral relationship with Israel and seeks to play a constructive role in Middle East peace negotiations;

Whereas Operation Enduring Freedom entered its 6th year on October 7th, 2007;
Whereas Turkey commanded the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan twice, from July 2002 to January 2003, and from February 2005 to August 2005;

Whereas Turkey has provided humanitarian and medical assistance in Afghanistan and in Iraq;
Whereas the Government of Turkey has made its base in Incirlik available for United States missions in Iraq and Afghanistan;

Whereas Secretary of Defense Robert Gates credits United States air bases in Turkey with handling 70 percent of all air cargo deployed into Iraq;

Whereas 95 percent of the Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protective vehicles (MRAPs) deployed into Iraq transit through air bases in Turkey;

Whereas MRAPs protect coalition forces from improvised explosive devices and roadside bombs;
Whereas the people of Turkey have been victims of terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda on November 15, 2003, and November 20, 2003;

Whereas the United States supports Turkey's bid for membership in the European Union; and
Whereas the Secretary of State has listed the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which has taken up arms against Turkey since its founding, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate—

1. reiterates its strong support for the strategic alliance between the United States and Turkey;
2. urges Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey to communicate the continuing support of the Senate and of the people of the United States to the people of Turkey;
3. condemns the violent attacks conducted by the Kurdistan Workers' Party over the last 2 decades;
4. urges Kurdish leaders in Iraq to deny safe harbor for terrorists and to recognize bilateral agreements between Iraq and Turkey for cooperation against terrorism;
5. encourages the Government of Turkey and the Government of Iraq to continue to work together to end the threat of terrorism; and
6. thanks Prime Minister Erdogan and the people and Government of Turkey for—

(A)assuming command of the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan from July 2002 to January 2003, and from February 2005 to August 2005;

(B) providing humanitarian and medical assistance in Afghanistan and in Irag;
(C) their willingness to contribute to international peace, stability, and prosperity, especially in the greater Middle East region; and

(D) their continued discussions with officials in the United States and Iraq regarding constructive stabilization efforts in northern Iraq.

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

Divide and Conquer

Monday, Oct. 29, 2007
Slate
By Christopher Hitchens

The United States should be squeezing Turkey, not the other way around.

Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani
In the past century, the principal victims of genocide or attempted genocide have been, or at least have prominently included, the Armenians, the Jews, and the Kurds. During most of the month of October, events and politicians both conspired to set these three peoples at one another's throats. What is there to be learned from this fiasco for humanity?

To recapitulate: At the very suggestion that the U.S. House of Representatives might finally pass a long-proposed resolution recognizing the 1915 massacres in Armenia as a planned act of "race murder" (that was U.S. Ambassador Henry Morgenthau's term for it at a time when the word genocide had not yet been coined), the Turkish authorities redoubled their threat to invade the autonomous Kurdish-run provinces of northern Iraq. And many American Jews found themselves divided between their sympathy for the oppressed and the slaughtered and their commitment to the state interest of Israel, which maintains a strategic partnership with Turkey, and in particular with Turkey's highly politicized armed forces.

To illuminate this depressing picture, one might begin by offering a few distinctions. In 1991, in northern Iraq, where you could still see and smell the gassed and poisoned towns and villages of Kurdistan, I heard Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan say that Kurds ought to apologize to the Armenians for the role they had played as enforcers for the Ottomans during the time of the genocide. Talabani, who has often repeated that statement, is now president of Iraq. (I would regard his unforced statement as evidence in itself, by the way, in that proud peoples do not generally offer to apologize for revolting crimes that they did not, in fact, commit.) So, of course, it was upon him, both as an Iraqi and as a Kurd, that Turkish guns and missiles were trained last month.

And here, a further distinction: Many of us who are ardent supporters of Kurdish rights and aspirations have the gravest reservations about the so-called Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK. This is a Stalinist cult organization, roughly akin to a Middle Eastern Shining Path group. (Its story, and the story of its bizarre leader Abdullah Öcalan, are well told in Aliza Marcus' new book Blood And Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence.) The attempt of this thuggish faction to exploit the new zone of freedom in Iraqi Kurdistan is highly irresponsible and plays directly into the hands of those forces in the Turkish military who want to resurrect Kemalist chauvinism as a weapon against Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government, which it sees as soft on Kurdish demands. There's a paradox here, in that the uniformed satraps who claim to defend Turkish secularism are often more reactionary than the recently re-elected and broadly Islamist Justice and Development Party. The generals vetoed a meeting earlier this year between Abdullah Gul—now president of Turkey and then foreign minister—and the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq. This alone shows that they are using the border question and the PKK as a wedge issue for domestic politics.

This is enough complexity to be going on with, but Congress and the executive branch have been handling it with appalling amateurishness. The Armenian resolution is an old story. I can remember when it was sponsored by Sen. Robert Dole and stonewalled by President Bill Clinton. What a shame that we didn't get it firmly on the record decades ago. But now a House and a White House that can barely bring themselves to utter the word Kurdish are both acting as if nothing mattered except Turkish amour-propre. And, as a consequence, the United States and its friends are being squeezed by Ankara instead of—to put it shortly—the other way around. This is disgracefully undignified.

In 2003, the Turkish authorities, who had been parasitic on American and NATO support for several decades, refused to allow our bases in Turkey to be employed for a "northern front" in the removal of Saddam Hussein unless their own forces were allowed to follow us into Iraqi Kurdistan. The Bush administration quite rightly refused this bargain. The damage done by Turkey's subsequent fit of pique was enormous—nobody ever mentions it, but if the coalition had come at Baghdad from two directions, a number of Sunni areas would have got the point (of irreversible regime change) a lot sooner than they did. The rogue PKK presence was not then a hot issue; Turkey simply wished to pre-empt the emergence of any form of Iraqi Kurdish self-government that could be an incitement or encouragement to its own huge Kurdish minority.

So, let us be clear on a few things. The European Union, to which Turkey has applied for membership with warm American support, has insisted on recognition of Kurdish language rights and political rights within Turkey. We can hardly ask for less. If the Turks wish to continue lying officially about what happened to the Armenians, then we cannot be expected to oblige them by doing the same (and should certainly resent and repudiate any threats against ourselves or our allies that would ensue from our Congress affirming the truth). Then there remains the question of Cyprus, where Turkey maintains an occupation force that has repeatedly been condemned by a thesaurus of U.N. resolutions ever since 1974. It is not our conduct that should be modified by Turkey's arrogance; we do a favor to the democratization and modernization of that country by insisting that it get its troops out of Cyprus, pull its forces back from the border with Iraq, face the historic truth about Armenia, and in other ways cease to act as if the Ottoman system were still in operation.

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

Interview With Murat Akgun of NTV R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Ankara, Turkey
September 20, 2007
QUESTION: Mr. Burns, good morning and welcome to the NTV studio.

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: Thank you very much.

QUESTION: It's not a secret that the Turkish public is expecting a step or steps from the United States of America against the PKK as soon as possible, especially in northern Iraq. Do you think that we can see such steps in northern Iraq in the short term?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: We are Turkey's greatest supporter on the PKK. We are against the PKK; we classify it as a terrorist organization; we do not give it any support; and we entirely sympathize with the Turkish people, the Turkish government. There was just an attack two days ago. A soldier was killed here in Turkey and I believe over 150 people have been killed this year by the PKK alone. And so we've got to work with Turkey and we want to work with Turkey to try to end this threat. Part of the answer will be working with the Iraqi leadership, specifically the Kurdish leadership in northern Iraq, to try to get them to give political support to the effort to stop the PKK. But we support Turkey entirely on this issue.

QUESTION: Last week there was a question to you from a journalist in Washington, if I'm not wrong. The question was can we see a step or steps from the US against the PKK in the next six months and then you said I believe so. If this is the correct answer as I remember it, what are you waiting for for some steps, especially in the military field in northern Iraq?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: Well, I think that the imperative here is two steps. First is to isolate the PKK diplomatically, convince the European countries not to allow the PKK to establish political front organizations in European capitals and is to brand the PKK and castigate it internationally as a terrorist organization. We the United States have contributed to that goal with Turkey, working with the Turkish government, and will continue that. The second is -- are there concrete measures that can be taken to protect the Turkish people and to protect the Turkish military from cross-border attacks? We are working with the Turkish government and the Iraqi government to try to create that environment where the PKK will no longer be able to attack. So we want to be helpful and we’re working with the Turkish government towards that end.

QUESTION: Are we still in the first step, Mr. Burns?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: No, I think we've…we’ve been in the first step for ten years. We are in both the first and second phases. And both of them are important.

QUESTION: You were talking about cooperation between Iraqi authorities and Turkey and especially Kurdish leadership and Turkey, but now there are two important questions. First, Iraqi authorities have no power everywhere in the country and second, the Kurdish leadership do not even qualify PKK as a terrorist organization. In this case, what kind of cooperation do you expect between Turks and Kurds?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: Well, I think there has to be political dialogue, frankly, with the Iraqi leadership and the Turkish government and the two have to talk. Hopefully the Turkish government and the United States government can convince the Iraqi leadership that this particular organization is a violent organization, it doesn't deserve to have any political support whatsoever, and it has to be kept away from the border areas with Turkey so that it cannot launch its strikes across the border. That is primarily a political question. So discussions are important. The United States can help to facilitate these discussions. We have our own discussions with the Iraqi government. I know that Prime Minister Maliki was here in Ankara just a couple of months ago. I know that he said some very critical things about the PKK when he was here and it was good to see that.

QUESTION: But on the other hand, during the visit of Mr. Maliki we couldn't even succeed to sign an agreement concerning the fight against terrorism.

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: Well, there's no question that Turkey deserves help from the United States. We are your ally. We are your friend. As a victim of terrorism, and we are a victim of terrorism, we sympathize entirely with the Turkish people and Turkish government so you should consider us your closest collaborator in this fight against the PKK.

QUESTION: When you say that the United States of America is also the victim of terrorism, I just remembered the statement of the Prime Minister of Turkey the day before yesterday. He said that even the Pentagon could not handle the terrorism. How do you evaluate this remark?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: Well, I think that first of all I had a very good meeting with Prime Minister Erdogan yesterday and I think that we, all of us, realize that the fight against terrorism is not going to be easy, that there are times when we'll have successes and there will be times when we'll have setbacks, but we've got to have a consistent effort. And it had to be universal. It has to be all democratic countries working together so in that respect I think there's a great connection between Turkey and the United States because we both need to struggle against terrorism, which is affecting both of our peoples.

QUESTION: Well, there's a discussion among the public in Turkey whether Turkish armed forces should make an operation into northern Iraq or not, if there is not enough cooperation between the Iraqi Kurdish leadership and Iraqi central authorities and Turkey. Do you think that it's going to be a legitimate right of Turkey to make an operation against PKK targets?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: We hope there will be adequate consultations and cooperation with the Iraqi government that will make it unnecessary for Turkey to take such an action. Obviously Iraq is a country that has experienced incredible trauma over the last four and a half years. We don't want to see anything develop that would further destabilize Iraq and so our vast preference would be to see the kind of trilateral cooperation among Iraq, Turkey and the United States that will make such an operation not necessary. And that's the goal of our policy.

QUESTION: I will have one more question concerning Iraq. There are press reports that the United States of America will withdraw forces from Iraq next year more and more and according to the same reports the Washington administration would like to use some harbors and bases in Turkey. During your visit to Ankara did you have any specific request concerning this issue to the Turkish authorities?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: I didn’t have…I did not have any specific request to the Turkish authorities and I can just tell you that President Bush spoke last week, a week ago, about our policy in Iraq. He was very clear that the United States will maintain our military forces in Iraq and that we intend to be successful there.

QUESTION: Iraq is not the only issue in the Middle East or among our neighbors. I would like to ask a question about Iran. How would you evaluate the cooperation between Iran and Turkey due to the fact that they are two neighboring countries?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: Well, first of all, we believe that Iran is a serious threat to peace. Iran is funding most of the Middle East terrorist groups and arming many of them. Iran is also trying to achieve a nuclear weapons capability. So Iran is a dangerous country. We want to work diplomatically, hopefully peacefully, with surrounding countries to try to isolate the Iranians. And, frankly, the United Nations has decided on sanctioning Iran so we are very pleased that Turkey is implementing the sanctions passed by the United Nations. We don’t believe there should be a business-as-usual attitude between any country and Iran because we need to pressure Iran economically so it will be more inclined to negotiate on this nuclear question.

QUESTION: There was very strong, hard statements from the French President and the French Foreign Minister concerning the nuclear capacity of Iran. Mr. Kouchner even mentioned the possibility of a war against Iran. Is it an option – a war between Iran and western countries or an operation of the United States of America if they do have nuclear weapons?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: Well, there's no question in our minds that the achievement by the Iranian government in the future of a nuclear weapons capability would change the balance of power in the Middle East in a very negative way – for Turkey, for the United States, for all of the European countries – so all of us want to stop the Iranians from doing so. We have said, we Americans, that we wish to pursue diplomacy, that we wish to work with other countries to try to convince the Iranians that they need to stop. Now, one way to do that is through negotiations. We've offered negotiations with Iran. Iran had turned us down twice in the last year. We've said that we'll sit with Russia and China and the European countries, we the United States, together, talk to the Iranians and try to figure out a diplomatic way forward, but the Iranians have said no to the negotiations and they continue their nuclear research programs. That's why we've turned to sanctions, economic sanctions, at the Security Council. And we would like all countries to support those sanctions.

QUESTION: Do you still believe that there is risk of war in the area because of the nuclear capacity of Iran in the short term or mid-term?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: Well, we hope very much to prevent a war. We hope very much that through a tough-minded policy of leverage of sanctions against Iran the Iranians will understand they are isolated in the world. Name the countries that support Iran in this quest for nuclear weapons – maybe Syria, maybe North Korea, maybe Belarus, maybe Cuba. There are very few countries supporting Iran in its quest for nuclear weapons in terms of its political aspirations. But most of the countries of the world are arrayed against Iran and advocating that Iran stop its nuclear weapons development and so it's important that Iran listen to the voice of the international community and understand how isolated it is.

QUESTION: A question about Syria – there was serious tension between Israel and Syria in recent days. There was a protest from the Turkish government to Israel. What kind of role may Turkey have concerning the tension between Israel and Syria and in general concerning the Middle East process, including the peace conference at the end of next month in Istanbul?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: Well I think in general Turkey is a unique country in the Middle East and has influence in the Middle East because Turkey can talk to nearly everyone and we appreciate the fact that Turkey has a good relationship with Israel. We appreciate the fact that Turkey is so close to some of the moderate Arab states. In the case of Syria and Iran, both of those countries are supporting terrorism and both of them are supporting Hezbollah which is a negative influence in the region and so we appreciate the fact that Turkey is a country that can send strong messages and communicate with countries to try to convince them to turn away in the case of Iran from a nuclear weapons program, in the case of Syria, from its support for terrorism.

QUESTION: About Cyrus, there were elections in Turkey and Greece and now we're going to have elections in the Greek part of Cyprus by the beginning of next year. What's going to happen? Do you see the chance of the development of a permanent solution at the end of 2008 in Cyprus?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: We hope there can be progress in Cyprus. It's been far too long. It’s been so many decades where there has been no peace in Cyprus…

QUESTION: I'm asking about a solution…

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: Well, we believe that the United Nations should restart its effort to find a peaceful solution and a just solution to the problem of Cyprus. The United States of course will be involved in this, as will Turkey, as will Greece and many other countries. We think it's very, very important that there be progress this year if that's possible. Now we know that Mr. Papadopoulos and Mr. Talat met recently. I don’t know if that meeting produced many positive results. I had very good discussions here in Ankara with the Turkish authorities. We are working with Turkey; we are working with Greece; and I look forward to meeting the Cypriot leader, President Papadopoulos, as well as Mr. Talat to see if we can push this process forward.

QUESTION: Last question concerning Turkish-Armenia relations. We know that the Washington administration wants Turkey to take some steps to normalization relations between the two countries but how about the Armenian responsibility? Don't you think that Armenia should also do something? For example withdraw its forces from Azerbaijan's occupied territory?

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: We have been concerned to see that since 1991 there has been no normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia. Turkey is an ally; Armenia is a friend. So we wish to see progress there. Obviously this is up to the two countries to work out and it’s going to be a two-way street as any relationship is in international diplomacy but our hope would be that there could be a normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia, that the border could be opened, there could be normal commerce and trade and a peaceful relationship. That may take some time, it may be difficult, but it's a necessary step in our view. And we hope to see the same kind of changes here within Turkey that will make this a place where minorities such as the Armenian population can live here in a peaceful way and contribute to Turkish society.

QUESTION: Mr. Burns, thank you very much for answering my questions.

UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: It's a pleasure. Thank you very much.

Released on September 20, 2007

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

U.S. Department of State warns Congress against Armenian Genocide Resolution

15.09.2007
PanARMENIAN.Net

It is appalling how little the US State Department understands the Armenian genocide issue. There can never be reconciliation without repentance and restoration. Resolution 106 is to affirm what happened and it is up to Turkey to step up to the plate.

“The United States condemnation of this tragedy is not at issue; the question is how best to facilitate reconciliation of all concerned parties with each other and with their painful and shared past,” U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns said when addressing the Department of State with a report titled “The future of the U.S.-Turkey relations.

“We believe passage of the U.S. House of Representative’s Resolution 106, which would make a political determination that the tragedy of 1915 constituted genocide, would undercut voices emerging in Turkey for dialogue and reconciliations concerning these horrific events. We therefore have recommended to Congress that it not pass such a resolution,” he said.

“We strongly encourage Turkey to normalize its relations and reopen its border with Armenia, steps that will help bring peace, prosperity and cooperation to the Caucasus. Now, in the wake of the AKP’s resounding electoral victories, is the time for Ankara to make a bold opening toward Armenia. And we hope that Armenia will respond in kind.

In conclusion, the United States and Turkey have enjoyed a relationship of Allied friendship for over half a century of enormous complexity, success, and promise. We have weathered a difficult period over the past four years. We now stand at the edge of a potentially new era in Turkish politics that offers a chance to restore a sense of strategic partnership in U.S.-Turkish relations,” Mr Burns said.

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

U.S. urges Turkey to take key policy steps

Saturday, September 15, 2007
Turkish Daily News

Ümit ENGİNSOY
WASHINGTON - Turkish Daily News


The United States, while praising Turkey's newly-elected civilian leaders as friends of America, has called on Ankara to take a series of critical political steps, including refraining from energy deals with Iran, opening its border with Armenia, lifting obstacles before freedom of speech and reopening a Greek Orthodox religious school.

"We very much welcome (Abdullah) Gül's election" as president, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Nick Burns, said late Thursday in a speech on U.S.-Turkish relations at the Atlantic Council, a think tank.

He said Washington was looking forward to working with Gül and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan both of whom he said were "good allies of the United States."

Following months of friction with the military over secularism, Erdoğan's ruling party, whose roots lie in political Islam, won a landslide victory in general elections on July 22. About a month later Gül, Erdoğan's former foreign minister, was elected president by the new Parliament.

Burns' policy speech, in which he focused on the prospects and challenges awaiting the U.S.-Turkish relationship, came ahead of high-level talks. He will travel to Ankara early next week, and Erdoğan is expected to meet with U.S. President George W. Bush in the United States within the next two weeks.

Burns highlighted Turkey's role as a bridge between the West and the chaotic Middle East, qualifying the NATO nation as the most successful example of secular democracy in Muslim-populated countries. He said Gül's election showed the maturity of Turkey's democracy.

Then he presented the Turks with a list of U.S. requests.

Turkey's "to-do list"

He made it clear that the United States was much annoyed by Turkey's move this summer to sign a memorandum of understanding on natural gas cooperation with Iran. Washington accuses Tehran of seeking to obtain weapons of mass destruction, and urges its allies to impose stronger sanctions on the Islamic Republic.

"Now is not the time for business as usual with Iran," Burns said. Earlier, U.S. officials warned that Turkey might be subject to U.S. sanctions if its planned natural gas cooperation with Iran progressed.

He said the U.S. administration was against the passage of an Armenian genocide resolution pending in the U.S. House of Representatives, but urged Turkey to move toward reconciliation with Armenia.

"We call on Turkey to normalize its relations and open its border with Armenia," Burns said. Turkey has no diplomatic relations with Armenia and accuses it of occupying part of neighboring Azerbaijan's territory in the Caucasus.

On the domestic policy front, Burns urged Ankara to abolish Article 301 of the Turkish penal code, which limits freedom of speech, according to critics.

He also said Turkey should reopen the Greek Orthodox theological school of Halki in Istanbul to boost religious freedom.

Nothing new on PKK front

However, on the critical matter of the fight against the terrorist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), whose militants attack Turkish targets from bases in neighboring northern Iraq, Burns did not have much to offer.

"I'm confident that we'll see progress," he said, without elaborating what could be done against the PKK on the ground.

U.S. and Turkish officials have said the Iraq issue, including the PKK problem, was the largest obstacle before U.S.-Turkish relations.

On Cyprus, Burns urged United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon to launch a fresh effort for the Mediterranean island's reunification. He reiterated Washington's backing for Turkey's future membership to the European Union.

Four former U.S. ambassadors to Ankara, Morton Abramowitz, Marc Grossman, Marc Parris and Robert Pearson, Turkey's ambassador to Washington, Nabi Şensoy, and Armenia's ambassador to Washington, Tatoul Markarian, were among dignitaries in Burns's audience.

Some analysts suggested that Burns's speech had little new to offer Turkey. One former U.S. diplomat said Burns had voiced several demands, but in most cases "there's no beef with Turkey."

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

The Future of the U.S.-Turkey Relationship

Saturday, 15 September 2007, 2:49 am
Speech: US State Department

R. Nicholas Burns
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Remarks at the Atlantic Council of the United States (ACUS)
Washington, DC
September 13, 2007

The Future of the U.S.-Turkey Relationship - Remarks at the Atlantic Council of the United States
As Prepared

I am pleased to be back at the Atlantic Council to discuss what is one of the most critical relationships for America in the world today -- the relationship between the United States and Turkey. Fred, thank you for hosting me tonight. I appreciate the invitation by Fred Kempe and the Atlantic Council Board to be here.

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Thank you to Henry Catto, Chairman emeritus of the Atlantic Council. Thanks to Ambassador Marc Grossman for his warm introduction. It is a pleasure to see the Ambassador of Turkey, Nabi Sensoy, the Ambassador of Armenia, Tatoul Markarian, Ambassador Mark Parris and Jim Holmes here tonight.

This is an important moment for the relationship between the United States and Turkey. Turkey has just elected a new government. Our countries now need to enter into a new era of our relationship and to commit to a revival of our very close friendship and alliance.

I will visit Ankara and Istanbul soon to bring a strong and clear message from our leadership -- the United States is committed to revitalize this critical partnership. Restoring a sense of strategic partnership in the broad range of U.S.-Turkish relations -- extending beyond government-to-government cooperation to a flowering of private sector ties between our people -- will be a major priority for the United States in the coming months. It is indeed time to rejuvenate and restore America's relationship with Turkey.

The Turkish people have just concluded important, even historic elections. These elections demonstrated the strong health of Turkey's democracy, the most impressive in the Moslem world. The result was a decisive and Turkey can now expect a period of renewal and growth at home and responsibility and challenge in its foreign policy. The United States government looks forward to a very close relationship with President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan.

President Bush and Secretary Rice respect both of these men. We have worked very well and productively with them in years past and know that will continue in the years to come. We would like to agree with the newly-elected Turkish leadership on a period in the coming months of high-level visits, discussions and joint commitment to face together the challenges of stability and peace in the Middle East.

Turkey, after all, has been one of our closest friends for over 50 years, dating back to the Truman Doctrine and the Korean War, and anchored by our Alliance in NATO. Throughout this long period, Turkey has always been among the United States' most dependable and important allies in an otherwise turbulent region. We look to Turkey, with its 160-year legacy of modernizing reform, as the most successful example in the world today of a secular democracy within a Muslim society that can inspire reformers in the greater Middle East and beyond.

Turkey's importance to the United States is even more pronounced at a time when the Middle East in the 21st century has replaced Europe in the 20th century as the most critical region for America's core national security interests. Turkey is the only country in the region that can work effectively with all of the others in the Middle East. Turkey's influence is substantial and unique. In this very important sense, Turkey is an indispensable partner to the United States in the Middle East.

Our history of close relations, shared interests, and common values makes Turkey one of the most important Allies of the United States anywhere in the world. That is not to say that our relationship has been perfect: we have certainly endured our share of difficulties, misunderstandings, and miscommunications in recent years.

From our perspective, 2002-2005 were particularly difficult, but we believe we have turned the corner together with the Turkish leadership. We now have a moment of opportunity to build stronger ties at all levels between our governments. For the past two years, especially, our leaders have worked with considerable energy to revive the relationship and to address more effectively the common challenges and opportunities before us.

One glance at the map demonstrates why it is so important to strengthen the ties between our two countries. Turkey is influential in the Balkans, in the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and in the greater Middle East. In this vitally important arc of countries where so much of our foreign policy attention now lies, Turkey is the vital link for the United States and our European allies in addressing common economic, security, and political challenges and opportunities in these critical regions.

On perhaps the most dynamic international issue of 2007 -- energy -- we share a common interest with the Turks. Turkey is the gateway for exports of oil and natural gas from the Caspian region and Iraq to Europe. Building on our successful cooperation in the 1990's to develop the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the South Caucasus gas pipeline, we now seek to expand this critical energy infrastructure into a Southern Corridor to help our European allies -- Greece, Italy and into Western Europe -- create a free market for energy supplies in Europe.

These efforts can also help Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan bolster their own independence by providing them access to European energy markets.

We hope it will be possible for Turkey to arrive at a swift agreement with Azerbaijan on transit terms. Turkey should also strive to find a pricing formula for future exports to Turkey from the Caspian Sea natural gas field of Shah Deniz, a necessary step to complete the inter-governmental agreement for the Turkey-Greece-Italy gas pipeline. Over the longer term, Turkey should continue to cooperate with the United States and our friends in Iraq, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan to expand gas production and exports to Turkey and onward into Europe.

In South Asia, Turkey is helping NATO to bolster regional security in Afghanistan, having twice commanded the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and now leading a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Wardak Province. Turkey has been an important arbiter between Afghanistan and Pakistan, providing a welcoming, neutral venue for Presidents Karzai and Musharraf to discuss issues of mutual significance.

It is in this area that we feel Turkey could make even more of an impact. Turkey could offer assistance to repatriated Afghan refugees from Pakistan, help both sides improve border management and customs collection, or support the emergence of Afghan-Pakistani Reconstruction Opportunity Zones, as the U.S. plans to do.

Turkey has also played a key role in Kosovo, where it has 660 personnel in KFOR and took over command of Multinational Task Force-South in May.

The Turkish government is playing a similarly constructive role in the extended Black Sea region, where Turkey's Operation Black Sea Harmony cooperates with NATO's Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean Sea to deter terrorism and bolster maritime security along NATO's southern and eastern flanks.

Turkey should encourage its neighbors to undertake democratic reform, fight corruption and organized crime, as well as look for ways to improve market economies in the region. The U.S. would like to work with Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria to take greater advantage of opportunities to expand NATO's activities in the Black Sea region.

And, Turkey is playing a regional leadership role in the Middle East. Turkey's common borders with Iraq, Iran, and Syria provide an opportunity to advance peace and stability, fight proliferation of nuclear weapons, and defeat terrorists in a region that is now the epicenter of U.S. foreign policy. Turkey can help deepen our understanding of strategic trends in the Middle East, while reinforcing our efforts to advance political and economic freedom and fight terror to advance peace and prosperity.

It is not only geography and common interests that make Turkey a key U.S. partner; it is our shared values of democracy, diversity, and tolerant faith that make us friends and allies. The United States and Turkey share a deep appreciation for the importance of separating civic and religious life.

In Turkey, reform movements during the late Ottoman period aimed to balance the claims that religion makes on personal lives with the exigencies of a modern state. One of the most famous waves of reforms, the so-called "Tanzimat" movement of the mid-19th Century was an attempt to give all residents of the empire the same rights, whether they were Muslim, Christian or Jewish.

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk rejuvenated Turkey's modernizing reforms, as he granted political rights to women, laid the foundation for Turkey's industrial rise, and established the Turkish Republic as a secular democracy. Turkey's commitment to secular democracy makes it a natural ally for the United States.

Turkey may now be at a new historical turning point, with a real opportunity to invigorate political and economic reforms that will anchor it in the European Union and bolster its ability to inspire reformers in the greater Middle East region. Parliamentary elections on July 22 and the election of Abdullah Gul as president on August 28 demonstrated once again that Turkey is a robust and ever-maturing democracy, one that is defined by respect for constitutional processes, with the country's political future determined by elections.

We welcome Mr. Gul's election as President. President Bush and Secretary Rice have good relationships with President Gul, and Prime Minister Erdogan, and look forward to developing these relationships.

The Justice and Development Party, or AKP, now controls the government, parliament, and presidency. At the same time, Turkish voters sent a message of moderation during the recent elections. While the AKP won a resounding victory, opposition parties received over 50 percent of the vote, and with more parties crossing the 10 percent electoral threshold the new parliament is more representative of Turkey's diverse voter sentiment. Turkey's voters thus appear to have signaled their desire for Prime Minister Erdogan and President Gul to deepen Turkey's secular democracy by rejuvenating political and economic reforms, but in the context of Turkey's Muslim society.

As Turkey's democratic institutions strengthen and as its reforms proceed, Turkey grows in importance to the U.S. as a strategic partner. Realizing the full potential of this partnership poses several immediate challenges to both of our countries. In the Middle East, Turkey can play a regional leadership role that could help the U.S. achieve some of its most pressing foreign policy goals, but which will require careful coordination to prevent our two countries from operating at cross-purposes.

At the top of the list is Iraq. Our decision to liberate Iraq from Saddam Hussein's brutality triggered an unprecedented wave of anti-Americanism in Turkey. Our official relations have recovered from the low-point of the Turkish Parliament's vote on March 1, 2003 to reject our request to move U.S. forces into Iraq via Turkey. Since then, Ankara has been a strong supporter of our efforts to stabilize Iraq, and has asked us not to abandon our goals, particularly safeguarding Iraq's territorial integrity. Turkey represents a critical logistical lifeline for our troops in Iraq and has made important contributions to Coalition operations there.

Turkey is similarly helpful in diplomatic efforts to bolster support for Iraq among its neighbors. The United States appreciates Turkey's willingness to host the next Extended neighbors ministerial in October, an important follow-up to the work begun at Sharm el-Sheikh last May. Secretary Rice announced this week that she plans to attend this meeting in Istanbul.

Turkey's willingness to help the international community address Iraq is all the more appreciated given the difficulties it is suffering as a result of attacks from PKK terrorists in Iraq. Let me assure you, the United States condemns the PKK as a vicious terrorist group. We mourn the loss of innocent Turkish lives in these attacks.

We remain fully committed to working with the Governments of Turkey and Iraq to counter PKK terrorists, who are headquartered in northern Iraq. We are making progress in putting in place the mechanisms required to produce such concrete results against the PKK. We will also follow up our success in working with Turkey and our other European partners to interdict PKK terror financiers in Europe and bring them to justice.

Turkey and the United States also face a challenge in Iran. We have worked well together to support of the clear international consensus demanding that Iran cease its nuclear weapons development programs. Turkey has also proven to be strong partner in countering Iran's support for terrorists in the Middle East.

But the United States and Turkey still need to work out some tactical differences in handling Iran. We understand that Iran is a neighbor of Turkey and key trading partner, which sends over a million tourists to Turkey each year. Turkey's recent conclusion of a memorandum on energy cooperation with Iran, however, is troubling. Now is not the time for business as usual with Iran. We urge all of our friends and allies, including Turkey, to not reward Iran by investing in its oil and gas sector, while Iran continues to defy the United Nations Security Council by continuing its nuclear research for a weapons capability

The United States and Turkey share a common interest in working toward a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. President Bush's vision is of two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security. The Palestinian Authority under President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad is the most capable Palestinian government since Oslo and is committed to being a partner for peace.

As we work to develop the economy and institutions of governance that will form the foundation of a Palestinian state, Turkey understandably can see opportunities to draw on its historical experience from the Ottoman era and its modern economic might to help restore prosperity to the Palestinian people, while drawing on its more recent experience in forging a close security partnership with Israel.

Turkey is unique in its dual identity as both a Middle Eastern and European country. We thus face important challenges in U.S.-Turkish relations with regard to deepening Turkey's integration in Euroatlantic institutions.

We are among the strongest supporters of Turkey's EU aspirations. We call on Europe's leaders to signal clearly and unambiguously that Turkey will have a voice in the European Union in the future. We believe both Turkey and the Euroatlantic community will benefit as Turkey advances toward EU membership. We wish to see an even more democratic and prosperous Turkey, which will make Turkey a stronger partner for the United States in Europe. The prospect of full membership in the EU is the right goal for Turkey and the future of the European Union.

Moreover, Europe's full embrace of a reformed Turkey will send a powerful signal to Europe's other Muslim populations that Islam and democracy are compatible, and that integration into mainstream European society is possible without surrendering one's Islamic identity.

This could be a crucial factor in defeating Europe's extremist recruiters, who prey on alienated Europe's Muslim populations. Those Europeans who oppose Turkish membership in the EU should keep in mind that it is not the Turkey of today, but an even more democratic Turkey of tomorrow that would that would join the EU after several more years of reform.

To reach this transcendent strategic objective, we hope Turkey will repeal Article 301 of the Penal Code, which restricts freedom of expression and has led to outlandish legal cases against private citizens and global figures such as Nobel Laureate Orhan Pamuk. We also hope Turkey will help make its own case with the EU by allowing the Ecumenical Patriarch's religious school at Halki in Istanbul to reopen decades after it closed.

We must also work with Turkey to strengthen NATO. Turkey has been a cornerstone of the Alliance since the 1952, serving as a barrier to Soviet expansion throughout the Cold War. Several generations of Turkish military officers enjoyed formative professional experiences while serving in NATO commands. Today, Turkey is a key NATO partner in Afghanistan and Kosovo, and is emerging as a critical potential partner in the vast majority of NATO's future contingencies, which lie to the southeast of Europe.

An important focus of Euroatlantic security cooperation is developing ways for the EU and NATO to work together in bringing their respective capacities to bear in strengthening stability and security in Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan and elsewhere. We appreciate the difficulties that such cooperation poses for Turkey given the still-evolving Turkey-EU relationship, the circumstances of Turkey's participation in activities within the European Security and Defense Policy, as well as the complications resulting from the lack of a Cyprus settlement.

Yet it is vital for all of us, including Turkey, that NATO and the EU are indeed able to work together in crisis areas around the world. For this and many other reasons, we call on all relevant parties to reinvigorate UN-brokered efforts to reach a comprehensive Cyprus settlement that reunifies the island into a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. We welcome last week's meeting of President Papadopoulos and Mehmet Ali Talat, and look forward to future such meetings to implement last year's July 8 agreement.

I intend to travel to Cyprus this autumn and will communicate to the Cypriot government leadership and the Turkish leadership, as well, the strong wish of the United States that we might all contribute to a breakthrough for peace after decades of crisis. The time has come for the United Nations and all of us to achieve a just solution to the long-festering problem of Cyprus.

Finally, the U.S. and Turkey face a serious challenge with regard to Armenia. Each year on April 24, Armenian Remembrance Day, President Bush has issued a public statement lamenting the mass killings and forced deportations of up to 1.5 million Armenians by Ottoman authorities at the end of World War I.

The United States condemnation of this tragedy is not at issue; the question is how best to facilitate reconciliation of all concerned parties with each other and with their painful and shared past. We believe passage of the U.S. House of Representative's Resolution 106, which would make a political determination that the tragedy of 1915 constituted genocide, would undercut voices emerging in Turkey for dialogue and reconciliations concerning these horrific events. We therefore have recommended to Congress that it not pass such a resolution.

We strongly encourage Turkey to normalize its relations and reopen its border with Armenia, steps that will help bring peace, prosperity and cooperation to the Caucasus. Now, in the wake of the AKP's resounding electoral victories, is the time for Ankara to make a bold opening toward Armenia. And we hope that Armenia will respond in kind.

In conclusion, the United States and Turkey have enjoyed a relationship of Allied friendship for over half a century of enormous complexity, success, and promise. We have weathered a difficult period over the past four years. We now stand at the edge of a potentially new era in Turkish politics that offers a chance to restore a sense of strategic partnership in U.S.-Turkish relations.

I will be traveling to Ankara soon to bring this message to the new government personally. The United States is determined to seize this opportunity to renew and strengthen our strategic partnership with Turkey. We look forward to working together with Turkish leaders who share this vision and determination to build this strong, vital and irreplaceable Turkish-American alliance for the 21st century.

Thank you.

ENDS

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

American-Turks parade in New York

Monday, May 21, 2007
Turkish Daily News
ELİF ÖZMENEK - NEW YORK

"Nowadays the Turkish Day Parade, which thousand of Turks from different parts of the U.S. attend, is a platform to pay tribute to the old homeland, strengthen the Turkish American community in the U.S. and promote Turkey to Americans. Every year around 100 floats in the cortege from soccer clubs to Turkish American Associations and folklore dance groups, to try to present different cultural aspects of their community. Gathering and marching are both political statements and cultural displays. They signify group identity and solidarity against others by taking part in a collective act and statement.
...
the 26th Turkish Day Parade managed to draw many Azerbaijanis, Turkmens, Crimean Turks, Circassians, Cypriot Turks, Karacay Turks, and even Albanians and Bosnians to the parade."

This weekend the 26th Annual Turkish Day Parade organized by the Federation of Turkish American Associations (FTAA) took place in New York. Thousands of Turkish flags decorated the city's famous Madison Avenue and more than fifteen thousand Turkish-Americans either marched along the main avenues of Manhattan or cheered for the parade despite the rainy day.

Over the years the meaning of the parade for Turkish American community has changed dramatically. The first official Turkish Day Parade in the city was held on April 23 1980. Those who attended that parade remember vividly that there were only two flags in the 150 people cortege. The FTAA could not get a permit for the parade for security reasons. As a result the small group had to walk on the sidewalk of New York's famous 5th Avenue. New York Police Department was very concerned also because the first informal Turkish Day Parade was organized to protest the murders The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) had committed. ASALA was a terrorist organization that aimed to compel the Turkish government to acknowledge publicly its alleged responsibility for the deaths of 1.5 million Armenians in 1915, pay reparations, and cede territory to Armenia. During its ten years of activity ASALA killed 39 Turkish diplomats and politicians in Western Europe, in the United States and the Middle East.

The FTAA could not get a permit for the parade in 1981 either. In 1982 however, with support from Ankara FTAA was able to get the permit to organize first official Turkish Day Parade. It was decided that the parade would take place on the weekend that is closest to May 19th, the Youth Day of Turkey.

In the 1980s the parade was a platform where Turkish Americans tried to draw the attention of American public to some of Turkey's international conflicts such as those with Armenia and Greek Cyprus. As years passed, the parade grew and around the mid-1990s became notably large. Over time, this one day event has been turned into a month long cultural festival.

Nowadays the Turkish Day Parade, which thousand of Turks from different parts of the U.S. attend, is a platform to pay tribute to the old homeland, strengthen the Turkish American community in the U.S. and promote Turkey to Americans. Every year around 100 floats in the cortege from soccer clubs to Turkish American Associations and folklore dance groups, to try to present different cultural aspects of their community. Gathering and marching are both political statements and cultural displays. They signify group identity and solidarity against others by taking part in a collective act and statement.

Sociologist Ilhan Kaya says that the Turkish Day Parade represents an opportunity to present the elements that constitute an ethnic identity.

“The very act of organizing a formal cultural parade that depicts the language, religion, food, sports, dances, clothing, history, music, and politics of a group ensures that their ethnic identity will remain a salient issue for the foreseeable future. These events allow Turkish Americans to influence the ways they will be understood by outsiders. These events serve as opportunities for communities to inform non-members about their distinctive traditions, culture, and history,” Kaya says.

This years' crowd of 15,000 is not a satisfactory participation rate for many. In the past four-five years the numbers reached 50,000. The rainy weather is blamed for lower participation however according to general public opinion the scandals within the FTAA and the recent political developments in Turkey estranged many from attending to this year's parade.

Furthermore because of early election rush in Turkey there was relatively low protocol participation from ministers and parliamentarians as well.

On the contrary the 26th Turkish Day Parade managed to draw many Azerbaijanis, Turkmens, Crimean Turks, Circassians, Cypriot Turks, Karacay Turks, and even Albanians and Bosnians to the parade.

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

‘New relation taking shape between Turkey and US’

3 April 2007
Today's Zaman

"I don't think the genocide resolution is the biggest problem between us {Turkey and the USA}. The biggest problem between us is the [terrorist Kurdistan Workers' Party] PKK issue and the future status of Iraq. That's our number one issue. The Armenian issue is a problematic one, something again where we need to tell our side of the story effectively. I heard some Turkish colleagues who said, "Let the resolution pass and get on with it." But I still tend to be on the side that the Armenian resolution is a wrong decision and shouldn't be passed by Congress. And I am optimistic that it actually will not pass this year."

Suat Kınıklıoğlu, a Turkish foreign policy expert and currently the executive director of the German Marshall Fund of the United States' office in Ankara, has said some American observers of Turkey have concerns about Turkish foreign policy moves because Turkey cannot communicate its objectives and intentions well. Indeed, he said, Turkey is reintegrating into the Middle East, which is not only in the interest of Turkey but also in the interest of its European and American partners.

"We need to try to ease the problems that arise at the moment between us and the United States, or us and the European Union, and help them to digest our new identity," Kınıklıoğlu said. "We come from an Ottoman state tradition. We feel like we don't need to tell others what we are doing, that others should understand us naturally, but that's not the case."

For Monday Talk, Kınıklıoğlu spoke with us about the new dimensions of Turkey's foreign policy, and how it has been affecting Ankara's relations, mainly with the United States and regional countries.

You have so much contact with Turkey observers in the United States. How do they see Turkey these days?

One of the biggest concerns I have been having in relation to how Turkey is perceived in Washington has been a worryingly negative interpretation of events in Turkey. And I think this has something to do with how analysts based in Washington interpret events in Turkey. The part of it might be that they are not physically in Turkey so they are not fully aware of the true dynamics of developments in Turkey. Two years ago this wasn't the case, but I think over the last year, since Turkey has been discussing the presidential election and then the new [parliamentary] elections, the political tension in Turkey has increased, so I think the way Turkey is interpreted in Washington has also changed.

Would you give specific examples of these perceptions?

Well, there are some people in the United States who talk about a military coup being imminent in Turkey. You know, the next president, his identity, has become very much our primary concern over the last couple of months, and it is going to intensify over the next few weeks. If you live in Washington and listen to some of the analysis there, you would think that there was an imminent danger of shariah being established in Turkey. I am not convinced that this sort of line is really objective about what is going on in this country.

What is going on in Turkey, in your opinion?

In my opinion, Turkey is going through a period of normalization in many respects, becoming a more open, more democratic, more transparent society. It is now healthily debating difficult issues like the Armenian issue, the Kurdish issue, how to accommodate religion within a secular democratic system, how to treat people who are not necessarily of Turkish ethnic background but are Turkish citizens. I think Turkey is going through a healthy period. The economy is going extremely well. However, some macroeconomic issues have almost been taken for granted. A couple of years ago, you couldn't go to a bank and get a loan for a house for 20 years. People seem to forget that we had 80 percent inflation. I remember vividly when people would be exchanging dollars in the morning and switching back to lira in the afternoon because of a volatile exchange rate. For four-and-a-half years we have been enjoying macroeconomic stability and good growth. While Europe is growing about 1 percent a year, we have been enjoying an average of 6.5 - 7 percent growth. This is very impressive, and we are doing this in an environment when there is a major war at our border. And at the same time, we are really intensely discussing some of these issues that I have just mentioned.

Do you think Americans who observe developments in Turkey are convinced that things are pretty normal or are they in a 'watch and see' mode?

Most of them remain concerned. I was in a workshop a few weeks ago in Washington. We were discussing these things. That the Americans express concern about Turkey is natural because Turkey used to be a a flank country defending the southeastern corner of the alliance. Now Turkey is more independent and becoming a regional power. The current tensions between the United States and Turkey on some of the issues in the region are normal tensions between a global hegemony and a regional power that is reasserting itself. So we are now experiencing a period where both sides need to adjust to this new situation. The Americans need to come to terms with the fact that there is a different Turkey at hand; it is no longer just a flank country in the southeastern corner of NATO, but is a country in a central location.

How serious are these 'tensions' you've just mentioned in the US-Turkish relationship?

We need to try to ease the problems that are arising at the moment between us and the United States or us and the European Union, and help them to digest our new identity. We Turks have a terrible problem with communicating what we are doing. I am part of the generation of Turks that emphasizes "Communication, communication, communication" because we generally don't communicate well what we are doing. One of the reasons I joined the GMF is because it is an organization with a very strong European network, and our work is really about Europe and the United States. And we see Turkey as part of Europe. In our work we bring in speakers who help Turks concern. And we Turks, as [former US Ambassador to Turkey] Marc Grossman said, "don't have PR genes." We come from an Ottoman state tradition. We feel like we don't need to tell others what we are doing; the others should understand us naturally, but that's not the case. Especially with a country like the United States, which has to deal with almost 200 countries on this planet, getting the attention of the US policy community or the US think tank community is a challenge. And Turkey should not assume that just by being Turkey or just by being located in this geography in itself will mean that there is going to be an interest in us. We shouldn't assume that the US always has a great interest in us. We should actually take our message to the United States in seminars, hold workshops with intellectuals who have direct contact with American counterparts and vice versa.

What is the US point of view regarding Turkey's relations with Iran?

In the United States right now the most important issue is Iran. Iraq, of course, is important, but the looming issue on the horizon is Iran. And when we talk about Iran, Turkey's relationship with its neighbors comes into question. In fact, the Turkish government has a foreign policy understanding that requires minimal problems with its neighbors. And over the last years, Turkey's relations both with Syria and with Iran have deepened; our trade has increased, our political dialogue has become deeper. I think in some quarters in Washington, this has been dealt with apprehension and concern. Turkey is also partly responsible for that perception taking shape because we have not been able to clearly communicate the intentions behind our foreign policy. But during the last six or seven months, there has been an effort to explain why Turkey is following the foreign policy it is following. That is actually not a source of concern but on the contrary, it is a development that should be welcomed by the United States.

Why is that?

This government's foreign policy has been largely inspired by Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu [who is the foreign policy advisor to the Turkish prime minister]. It is based on the understanding that Turkey should normalize its relations with its neighbors. And I think with the exception of Armenia, this policy has been successful. Iraq is a special case because we don't have an Iraqi state right now. With Iran this policy has been successful, with Russia it has been successful, with Syria it has been successful, and with Greece we now have good relations. I mean in general, this intellectual policy is a fresh and welcome departure from the old and narrow understanding of our foreign policy, which was "peace at home, peace abroad" which wasn't inspiring and didn't allow for a sophisticated outreach to our neighbors. One of the things that of course has come out from this is that Turkey has become now very influential and active in the Middle East. Turkey is one of those unique countries that can speak both to Israel and to Palestine, or can have good relations both with the United States but also with Saudi Arabia, Iran and many others. And I think this has been a welcome and fresh new development in our foreign policy, which is not always well understood in Washington.

What would be bothersome for the United States in that regard?

The primary concern we hear from our American colleagues is when there was an effort to isolate Syria two years ago, Turkey was increasing its trade and its contacts with Syria. There is also a timing issue here. Turkey's opening up to this region coincided with wanted to isolate these places. But Turkey cannot limit its foreign policy potential because other countries have an isolationist policy. Turkey would wish that this new policy would have occurred in another time period. But Turkey needs to trade with Syria, needs to trade with Iran, and Turkey wants to create an interdependency with these countries that would allow a moderating influence to be projected on these countries. We've been actually living through historic times because Arabs no longer perceive Turkey as the old Ottoman Empire. Now we are experiencing days when Turkish columnists are being translated into the Arab press and read widely, and Arab opinion pieces are translated in the Turkish press. Thus Turkey is reintegrating into the region, and that's not only in the interest of Turkey; it is also in the interest of our European and American partners. Because Turkey is in fact a security-producing and security-generating country, and can be and I think is an inspiration for many countries in the region. It may not be a perfect model because we have different historical experiences, but it can be an inspiration for many countries that aspire to becoming more open, more modern countries in which both democracy and Islam can cohabit.

US officials themselves usually say they see Turkey as a model country in the Middle East. Do they reinforce this thought by asking Turkey to play an intermediary role in the region, for example, in the conflict with Iran?

Turkey, of course, enjoys some channels of dialogue that our American friends sometimes don't have, especially with Iran. Turkey is not the only channel to Iran or Syria. Europeans also have channels of dialogue with them, but I think the difference Syria and Iran trust Turkey much more than many of the Europeans. Turkey is perceived as a country that has the ability to take independent decisions. The March 2003 decision not to allow US troops to invade Iraq from Turkish territory was a key turning point. And I think in that regard, our American colleagues from time to time do make use of Turkish diplomacy and Turkish access to Iranian and Syrian officials -- not only with Iran and Syria but also with other regional countries like Saudi Arabia and others.

Sometimes it's been said that the biggest obstruction in the way of the US-Turkish relationship is the Armenian genocide resolution. Do you agree with that?

I don't think the genocide resolution is the biggest problem between us. The biggest problem between us is the [terrorist Kurdistan Workers' Party] PKK issue and the future status of Iraq. That's our number one issue. The Armenian issue is a problematic one, something again where we need to tell our side of the story effectively. I heard some Turkish colleagues who said, "Let the resolution pass and get on with it." But I still tend to be on the side that the Armenian resolution is a wrong decision and shouldn't be passed by Congress. And I am optimistic that it actually will not pass this year.

If it passes, do you think it will be disaster for bilateral relations?

If it passes, I think Turkey will take some measures; it will counter this sort of affront, this inappropriate action by the Congress. I think in the end, especially given our more problematic relationship with the European Union, I think some sort of sobriety will set in and both Turkey and the United States will continue to find ways to work together, especially in Iraq. If the resolution does not pass, it will be a much more constructive and cordial working environment with the United States on Iraq than it might be if the resolution passes.

What do you expect to happen regarding Turkey's concerns about developments in Iraq and the role of the United States?

The United States is one of the primary determinants of what is going to happen in Iraq. Turkey has an interest in both communicating and influencing the events in Iraq. We have an Iraq with a very problematic situation. You have the presence of the PKK, which always has the potential to strike Turkish targets, kill Turkish soldiers. And then you have also the future status of Iraq, which may produce an entity, a Kurdish entity; I don't know in what form or shape. It could be a federal entity, it could be an independent one. Well, you could have decades-long internal civil war in Iraq. Turkey does not want that sort of instability to spread from Iraq into its own territory. The one thing that many people forget is that in 2003, when the war started, the last thing that people in the Southeast of Turkey wanted to hear was "war." In 2003, it was right around the time that Turkey was winning peace with its Kurdish citizens. Trade and investment had started to increase, tourism started to increase, with buses of western Turks traveling to Mardin, Urfa, Van and other places. And it was precisely the wrong time when the United States decided to invade Iraq because it complicated our own problems with our citizens of Kurdish background.

Some US officials have mentioned that the United States will take radical steps against the PKK. What could those be?

That could mean closure of some camps, the handing over of some of the PKK leadership. These are all nice things, and we have been hearing such promises for months now since the PKK coordinator Gen. Ralston [former retired NATO commander Joseph Ralston, who is the US envoy to coordinate efforts to fight the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)] has been assigned, although we have yet to see the materialization of something meaningful. Some people think that Turkey is eager to make a military intervention into Iraq. This is not true. Turkey does not want to intervene in Iraq. We would like the Kurdish authorities involved in Iraq and for the Iraqi authorities in Baghdad to work in cooperation with the United States to deal with this issue. The PKK is a terrorist organization; it is listed as one by the United States. We expect the Iraqi authorities to deliver on what they have been saying to our leadership, but we need to see those things happen.


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PROFILE
Suat Kınıklıoğlu

Suat Kınıklıoğlu has been the executive director of the German Marshall Fund of the United States' (GMF) new office in Ankara since 2005. He previously worked on Black Sea security and strategic issues as a transatlantic fellow with an organization in Washington, D.C. He came to the GMF from the Ankara Center for Turkish Policy (ANKAM), where he served as the center's director and editor of Insight Turkey, a quarterly publication on Turkish foreign policy issues. Before his tenure at ANKAM, Kınıklıoğlu worked as a development officer responsible for Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan at the Canadian International Development Agency, based in Ankara. Prior to that, he was a senior political and economic research officer at the Australian Embassy in Turkey. He holds the rank of division/liaison squadron commander in the Turkish Air Forces. His publications include "History in the Making: Transformation in Turkey "; "Kirkuk, Northern Iraq and the 'Grand Bargain'"; "Dink, Doves and Democracy"; "Mind Your Own Business, France" and "Spurned by the West, Turkey Looks Eastward."

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.