Misinformation regarding ties between Armenia and Kurdistan Workers Party is possible prelude to aggression

26 Dec. 2007
Regnum
By Armen Ayvazyan

Recently, the Azeri mass media disseminated information claiming that “Armenia is settling Armenians and Kurds, emigrants from Syria and Iraq, in Nagorno Karabakh and now it also plans to host terrorists from the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).” REGNUM asks Armen Ayvazyan, political scientist and Director of the “Ararat” Center for Strategic Research, to comment on this.

The new Turkish deliberations regarding ties between the PKK and Armenia that were voiced in recent weeks and the immediate joining-in of the official Baku should be considered in several aspects: first, in the context of Turkey’s consistently hostile policy towards independent Armenia; second, in the light of the acceleration in the pace of Azerbaijan’s preparation for a large-scale war of aggression against Artsakh and Armenia; and third, in the context of the continued passive information policy of Armenia.

The Turkish propaganda campaign alleging that Armenia supports and even provides bases for the PKK was first launched in 1993 and continued at varying degrees of intensity up to 2000, when the PKK temporarily extinguished the insurgency. The following headlines from the Turkish press convey an idea of the scale of the initial campaign: “Syria Flies PKK Militants to Armenia;” “PKK Will Attack with ASALA in the Spring;” “Intelligence Report Details Armenia-PKK ties;” “PKK Reportedly Moving to Iran, Armenia.” (1) Moreover, the Turkish Daily News article published on April 16, 1998, asserted without any proof that purportedly the PKK has 7 bases in Armenia, 11 in Iran, 4 in Russia and 1 in Cyprus. At the time Azerbaijan joined in this Turkish propaganda campaign when its defence minister declared that supposedly "200 Kurdish terrorists are being trained in the Lachin region, occupied by the Armenian aggressors, and another 457 Kurdish fighters are receiving full military training in Armenia, to be later deployed in the territory of Turkey. (2)

A number of high-ranking Turkish officials, including the Chief of Staff of the Turkish army, have made statements regarding ties between the PKK and Armenia. On October 11, 1998, Turkey’s Secretary of State Metin Gurderen openly threatened Armenia with war: “If Armenia supports separatists, then we have made our decision, the button has been pressed. A war might break out any moment.” (3)

Many suggest that the Turkish allegations regarding Armenia-PKK ties are intended only for “domestic consumption”, that they are put forth to explain the prolonged nature of the Kurdish armed resistance and to satisfy the hostile sentiments of the Turkish public towards Armenia. However, the reality is even more dangerous. The true purpose of this continuous and well planned false propaganda, coordinated with Azerbaijan, regarding Armenia-PKK ties is to create new and additional causes for exerting constant pressure on Armenia, to demonise Armenia and NKR in the eyes of the international community and to prepare the information front for the planned military aggression by Azerbaijan, with a possible direct intervention of Turkey. Let’s not forget that using the pretext of pursuing PKK, Turkey has periodically been invading Northern Iraq. Within the period of 1991 and the beginning of 1999 Turkey carried out 55 incursions into Northern Iraq, which the international community although did not authorize, but neither did it condemn. Four of them were large-scale operations with the participation of over 20,000 Turkish soldiers. (4)

Recently, new information was published revealing that Turkey planned an incursion into Armenia in October 1993, using the very same Kurdish bases as a pretext. (5) Leonidas Khrisantopolos, the Greek Ambassador to Armenia in 1993-1994, stated that the then Turkish Prime Minister Tancu Chiller had come to an agreement with the speaker of the Russian parliament Ruslan Khasbulatov on launching a few “surgical” strikes against Armenia. This information was indirectly confirmed by RA Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanyan in his interview to “Azg” daily (October 4, 2001), as well as by the former head of the National Security of Armenia Eduard Simonyan. (6)

Before that Western sources had reported that twice in 1993, in April and September, Turkey deployed its tank, mechanized and other units on the border with Armenia, the Turkish armed forces were brought to high state of combat readiness and Prime Minister Tancu Chiller warned she would ask the parliament for authorization to start military action, if Armenia touched any part of Nakhijevan. (7) Consequently, it is no accident that reports about PKK bases allegedly located in Armenia started to appear in the Turkish press as of Fall 1993. It is even less of an accident that in the above-mentioned reports the Turks indicated a number of locations in Armenia for supposed PKK bases (including the surrounding areas of the Armenian Atomic Power Plant and the Lachin region). (8)

Well affected by the Turkish propaganda some Western information agencies and think tanks presented the non-existent ties between Armenia and the PKK as a widely known fact. (9) Thus, in 1999, after the declaration of cease-fire by the PKK, one of the most famous American institutions of geopolitical research, Stratfor, apparently at the bidding of the Turks, trumpeted twice (on August 23 and November 23, 1999) to the whole world that the PKK squads were supposedly retreating to Armenia, for rearming and retraining in bases prepared for them beforehand. (10)

The halting of the Kurdish guerrilla war since 2000 (formalized only in 2002 (11)), to some extent deprived Turkey of the possibility to play the Kurdish card against Armenia. That is why the Chief of Staff of the Turkish armed forces Hussein Kivrikoghlu made a new false statement in the beginning of 2002, which alleged that Armenia possesses weapons of mass destruction, and, consequently, the same measures of punishment should be applied against Armenia as those against Iraq. (12)

On June 1, 2004, the PKK, now operating under the name CONGRA-GEL, terminated its 5-year old unilateral truce, (13) thus confirming that the Kurdish insurgents in Turkey are a long-term strategic factor in the region.

The latest insinuations coincided almost to the date with the intensification of Baku’s war rhetoric and particularly with the statement made by the Azeri Defence Minister Safar Abiyev that “as long as the Azeri territories remain occupied by Armenia, the probability of war is almost 100 percent.” Mr Abiyev’s statement was made on November 27 at the closing press conference of the Meeting of the CIS Defence Ministers Council in Astana. On November 30, with a direct reference to the Turkish intelligence, the Turkish pro-government newspaper “Zaman” disseminated misinformation about talks between Armenia and the PKK and alleged about the installation of bases for Kurds in NKR, in the towns of Shushi, Lachin and Fizuli. (14) This bait was immediately caught and circulated by the American United Press International. (15) On December 10, Araz Azimov, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan and Azerbaijani President’s Special Representative on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, stated about “readiness of Baku to launch anti-terrorist operations against the PKK’s military detachments stationed in Nagorno-Karabakh.” (16) It is exactly the coordination of activities between Baku and Ankara with respect to the timing and target of information attack that should be cause for concern. All these could be a prelude to not so virtual attacks.

The corresponding government bodies of Armenia should treat this newly unleashed campaign of Turkish-Azerbaijani propaganda in all seriousness. The brief refutations voiced by the Armenian MFA in this case are not at all effective. A well-supported clarification and condemnation of all the underpinnings of this old/new anti-Armenian row is necessary, including an exposition of all the dimensions, of its true purpose and possible consequences for the peace and stability in the region. Otherwise, it is impossible to expect the understanding and support of the international community for Armenia’s foreign policy positions, including for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

(1) Sezai Sengun, “Syria Flies PKK Militants to Armenia,” Hurriyet, 10 November, 1993, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (further in FBIS Daily Report): West Europe, 15 Nov. 1993, p. 72; Gorsel Polat, “PKK Will Attach with ASALA in the Spring,” Cumhuriyet, 27 December 1993, in FBIS Daily Report: West Europe, 5 January 1994, p. 29; Sinan Onus, “Intelligence Report Details Armenia-PKK ties,” Aydinlik, 29 January 1994, in FBIS Daily Report: West Europe, 3 February 1994, p. 36; “PKK Reportedly Moving to Iran, Armenia,” Turkish Daily News, 1 February 1994, in FBIS Daily Report: West Europe, 7 February 1994, p. 44.

(2) Elmira Akhundova, "Defense Minister Abiyev: “We are keen on privileged partnership with NATO,” Azernews/Azerkhabar 2/17/99 — 2/23/99.

(3) RFE/RL Newsline Vol. 2, № 197, Part I, 12 Oct. 1998, Transcaucasus and Central Asia.

(4) Ed Blanche, “Terrorism: Turkey seizes PKK commander,” Jane's Intelligence Review-Pointer, 1 June, 1998. The same source notes that since the start of the Kurdish rebellion in 1984 through 1998 Turkey destroyed or deported 3000 Kurdish villages. According to data of the Turkish army, 39900 PKK fighters were taken out of action. The losses of the Turkish army amounted to 4600 deaths.

(5) См. Leonidas T. Chryzantopoulos, Caucasus Chronicles: Nation-Building and Diplomacy in Armenia, 1993-1994 (Princeton & London: Gomidas Institute Books, 2002), pp. 76-78, 155. “The Sensational Announcement of Leonidas Chryzantopoulos”, Golos Armenii, 19 September 2002 (in Russian).

(6) “'Turkey Really Was Going To Attack Armenia in Autumn 1993', Former Head of State Department of National Security, Major General Eduard Simoniants Says,” Noyan Tapan News Agency, Yerevan, September 23, 2002.

(7) R. Ernest Dupuis and Trevor N. Dupuis, World History of Wars. Book Four: 1925 – 1997 Saint Petersburg — Moscow: Polygon – Ast., 1998), pg. 754 (in Russian).

(8) Rouben Paul Adalian, “Armenia's Foreign Policy: Defining Priorities and Coping with Conflict,” in Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, eds., The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1995), p. 318.

(9) For example, see Ed Blanche, “Terrorism: Turkey seizes PKK commander,” op. cit..

(10) Stratfor.com: “Where, oh where, has the PKK gone?” 1999.08.27; “PKK Wields Pipeline Leverage,” 1999.11.23.

(11) Officially the temporary halt in the armed resistance was announced after the regular 5th assembly of the PKK. It became known on February 6th, 2002, from the announcement of MED TV (see Akop Chakryan, “PKK decided to halt armed resistance in Turkey”, Azg, February 8th, 2002, #24, in Armenian).

(12) Here is an excerpt from the announcement distributed by PanARMENIAN.net on that occasion: “Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Turkey Hussein Kivrikoghlu stated the other day that Armenia possessed mass destruction weapons … This statement is included in the list of the six ‘apprehensions’ of Turkey that Kivrikoghlu had presented to Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit before the latter's visit to the U.S.A. Speaking about the negative response of Turkey to the possible U.S. strikes on Iraq, Kivrikoghlu stated not only Saddam Huseyn regime, but also Armenia, Syria, Iran and some other countries possessed weapons of mass extermination. In the words of the chief of the general staff of Turkey, sanctions like those used against Iraq, should be applied to Armenia.” See also. “Azeri ex-military men on threat if Armenia has weapons of mass destruction,” Azerbaijan News Service TV January 8, 2002; “Does Armenia Possess a Mass Destruction Weapon?” Azerbaijan News Service, January 9, 2002; “Armenian Defence Ministry spokesman calls Turkish general's statement 'absurd',” Arminfo, January 7, 2002.

(13) Selcan Hacaoglu, “Turkey's Kurdish Rebels End 5-Year Truce”, Associated Press News, 1 June 2004.

(14) Ercan Yavuz, “PKK looks into relocating to Karabakh,” 30.11.2007 http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=128340. It must be noted that even a month before this, on October 29 the same “Zaman” newspaper published an article titled “Relations between Armenian and PKK terrorism”, full of myths about Armenian-Kurdish relations during the 1980’s and 90’s, with an indication of dates and locations, intended to give the “information” semblance of veracity. That article seemed to prepare ground for the subsequent direct accusations.

(15) “PKK reportedly planning move to Azerbaijan,” United Press International, Published: Dec. 1, 2007 at 1:49 AM.

(16) Araz Azimov: Azerbaijan is ready to launch operations against the Kurdish guerrillas in Nagorno-Karabakh, REGNUM News Agency, 10:22 11.12.2007 (in Russian).

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

Turkey: Seeking an Outlet for Expansion

December 12, 2007
Stratfor

Summary

Turkey is flexing its muscles as it seeks an avenue to expand.

Analysis

Turkish President Abdullah Gul arrived in Kazakhstan on Dec. 12 for a three-day visit primarily aimed at furthering Turkish business interests in the region. The visit is symptomatic of a country seeking an outlet for its rising power and ambition.

Turkey is a rising power economically, militarily and politically, with an economy worth some $400 billion and the second-largest military in NATO. Yet it is also a country rather conflicted about its place in the world. Since the end of World War I the Turks have existed in a sort of cultural limbo, shunning their Islamic and imperial past, yet being denied full membership in the West in general, and the European Union in specific.

Over the past decade, the Turks have come to terms with the idea that they have made it as far into Europe as Europe will allow: They enjoy a customs union with the European Union, an agreement functionally equivalent to the U.S.-Mexico relationship via NAFTA. But EU membership is out of the question. Now, they are casting about for a new national goal.

The lands surrounding modern Turkey echo with the voices of Turkey's imperial past. All provide certain opportunities for the expansion of Turkish influence, yet none of the options leap out as being obvious -- and none will be easy.

In Central Asia, cultural links to the region's Turkic peoples may give the Turks access -- but the Russians have deeper and more recent ties, while the Chinese are splashing around more money. The Balkans provide Turkey a chance to leverage NATO links and cultural connections and force the Europeans to treat them with respect, but ultimately it is Brussels and Washington who most reliably shape events in Southeastern Europe. Working in the Caucasus helps buffer Turkey against a resurging Russia, but there is strong competition from not only Russia, but also Iran and Armenia. The only reason Iraqi Kurdistan has proven so hot-button in recent months is because the Turks perceive Kurdish autonomy across their southern border as a direct threat to the unity of Turkey itself. Like in its other spheres of potential interest, Turkey has no particular advantage in operating to its south either.

Yet Turkish power continues to rise, and it is only a matter of time before it seeks an outlet. Its economy has stabilized after a 2001 crash, and has grown strongly ever since. The government is consolidated under a single party to a degree absent since the time of Kemal Ataturk. The military is strong, flexible and deployable. This broad-spectrum strength allows Turkey to have its fingers in a lot of different pots. The only thing lacking is a strategic decision by the Turks about which direction is most important to Turkey. Once that decision is made, there are no internal barriers to Turkish movement.

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

Georgia, Azerbaijan: A New Oil Terminal, and More Money for Baku

November 21, 2007
Stratfor

There is a mistake in the article below. Russia does not have peacekeepers deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Summary

Georgia and Azerbaijan inaugurated a new oil terminal in the Georgian Black Sea port of Kulevi. Not only does this translate into more oil and petroleum products for the West, it also means Baku's coffers will be full like never before.

Analysis

Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev opened a new oil terminal Nov. 21 in Georgia's Black Sea port of Kulevi. The Kulevi terminal, which Azerbaijan's state-owned oil company SOCAR will run, will start with a capacity of 100,000 barrels per day (bpd), but that is expected to double.

The Kulevi oil terminal will supply the West with crude oil and refined products from Azerbaijan, which has received increasing attention as Europe looks to decrease its energy dependence on politically hot countries such as Russia, and as Azerbaijan seeks export options outside its typical use of Russian energy infrastructure. Over the past two years, Azerbaijan and Europe have built an energy relationship, with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and Turkey-Greece Interconnector (TGI) natural gas pipeline coming on line. What is different about Kulevi is that a third of the exports will be refined petroleum products -- something Azerbaijan has not exported to the West before.

The Kulevi terminal will make Azerbaijan the big winner -- especially financially. The BTC alone has brought $3 billion to Azerbaijan in the first year of operations. The money flow is expected to increase vastly with the TGI and now Kulevi coming on line.

Energy wealth has doubled Azerbaijan's gross domestic product, but the sudden wealth is very worrying to certain of Azerbaijan's neighbors because the majority of the money is going toward defense. Azerbaijan's defense budget has jumped from just a few hundred million a year to a billion this past year. The country is arming itself, and neighboring Armenia is closely watching. The two countries have been deadlocked over the Azerbaijani secessionist region of Nagorno-Karabakh -- a conflict that has flared into a war in the past. Azerbaijan's armament now has many wondering if Baku is planning another conflict against a neighbor that has been cut out of the region's recent energy wealth.

But there is another player in this game: Russia. Moscow has continually been part of the negotiation over Nagorno-Karabakh and currently has peacekeepers deployed there. Should the conflict spin up again, Russia would definitely sweep into action as the "great mediator." Currently it is playing both sides by supplying both Armenia and Azerbaijan with weapons, though Baku obviously has its own money to buy them. However, as Azerbaijan becomes more of an energy rival to Russia, Moscow has an increased interest not only in arming both sides, but also in seeing Azerbaijan fully destabilized by embroiling itself in a messy conflict.

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

Turkey: From Bloody Birth to Power Broker

21 Nov. 2007
Antiwar.com, CA
by Ann Berg

According to legend, its flag sprang from the reflection of a star and the crescent moon in a pool of native warriors' blood. The national anthem exults, "Martyrs would gush out were one to squeeze the soil!" Of all the Muslim countries created after World War I, only Turkey succeeded in expelling Western occupiers to achieve a modern statehood that many consider miraculous. Today, its treatment by the U.S. as a backwater pawn has roused the nation to defiance: 86 percent of all Turks now hold a negative view of America.

Ruled by Muslim Turks since 1453, the Ottoman Empire entered a long period of decline during the 19th century. Shrinking in territories and burdened with war debt, it defaulted on its international loans in 1875, drawing France and Britain to Constantinople – present-day Istanbul – to collect repayment from the Ottoman treasury. When the sick man of Europe crumbled during World War I, world leaders carved it into a dozen pieces under the 1920 Treaty of Sevres and subsequently refined the borders under the Sykes-Picot agreement. A mandate system that allowed the newly formed entities varying degrees of independence delineated five states: Britain claimed Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan (now Jordan), while France took Syria and Lebanon.

Because the Entente powers considered the Anatolian Turks incapable of self-rule, they parceled the strategic coastal areas among the victors. The British, the French, and the Italians sent occupation forces to Constantinople, and Greece, staunchly backed by Britain, took over the Aegean port of Smyrna (Izmir). Its goal was to restore Constantinople – the seat of the Greek-speaking Christian empire for a millennium – to its Byzantine glory. And finally, to the east, the Bolsheviks were eager to stamp a communist footprint on this strategic landmass. Strapped for foreign exchange, Russia needed unencumbered transit from the Black Sea through the Dardanelles to export its wheat surplus and newly discovered crude oil.

Against this backdrop, by 1922, the Turks drove out the Greeks (who had advanced into the central plateau with the goal of capturing the newly declared capital of Ankara), expelled the European powers, and reclaimed large territories to the east from Armenia. The Turkish-Greco war still lingers bitterly. Historical records blame the Greeks for a scorched-earth policy as they were driven out of Smyrna, while others depict the Turks burning the Greek and Armenian Christian villages to the ground. Witnesses say that 75 percent of Smyrna was destroyed. Standing on the waterfront of the ancient Mediterranean port, I asked a Turkish friend what happened during the postwar deportation of the remaining Greek and Armenian communities, and he quietly told me, "The boats came and they went."

By 1923, all Western forces had demobilized. Turkey established most of its modern-day borders under the Treaty of Lausanne. Although the U.S. had stayed out of the Turkish wars, Turkey's success at Lausanne caused the U.S. ambassador to Germany to proclaim, "Christian civilization was crucified … and the Stars and Stripes were trailed in the mire in the interest of a group of oil speculators."

Kemalism

Anyone visiting the capital city of Ankara is struck by the ubiquitous presence of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the modern Turkish state. His likeness appears in every visual form imaginable, gracing photographs, paintings, busts, masks, bas-reliefs, and statues. On the main thoroughfare, his face gazes out at the street procession from gigantic Orwellian tapestries unfurled from the tops of buildings. The symbolism is forceful – it serves the citizenry as a permanent reminder of Turkey's struggle for independence 84 years ago (Oct. 29) and fuses the state and the man into an enduring mythological unity.

Ataturk's life was a one-man revolution of breathtaking proportions. Officially, he is credited with the establishment of a modern, Western-leaning republic that included a civil code and language reform, universal education, equal inheritance and voting rights for women, and the abolition of the Caliphate, as well as industrial projects, including railway development and state-run manufacturing. Accounts of his personal life are dizzying: war hero, president (Time dubbed him "dictator"), educator, arts patron, father of seven adopted daughters – all of which he managed while drinking himself to death by age 57. But beneath the glowing biography is a darker story of Kemalism. While espousing republican principles and secularism, the doctrine sought to unify Turkey as one culture and one language by forced assimilation. The new republic outlawed mystical and ecstatic orders such as Sufism and denied the Kurds – a minority accused of deviant worship and orgiastic sexual practices – basic expression of culture and language. As early as 1925, uprisings were repressed with bombardment, slaying, and hanging. Beneath the philosophy of rational enlightenment lay brutal repression and a strong dose of militarism.

After World War II

Since the Korean War and following Turkey's entry into NATO (never mind that it is nowhere near the Atlantic), the U.S. has assumed Turkey would dutifully bow to America's dictates. But Turkey – boosted by its booming economy and its perception of the U.S. as a clumsy brute at its doorstep – is experiencing a resurgence of nationalism. Its parliamentary rejection in 2003 of the coalition's plan to stage the Iraq invasion through Turkish territory and its embrace of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan – a devout Muslim – have caught the U.S. completely flatfooted. The U.S. government fails to see that its transformative design for the region and Turkey's desire for border integrity and economic expansion are on a collision course.

On the economic front, Turkey, which has an energy deficit, envisions becoming an energy transit hub. Its southeastern port of Ceyhan is the terminus for one pipeline originating from the Caspian Sea port Baku (BTC) and another from Kirkuk, Iraq. Turkey projects earning several hundred million dollars in transit fees per year from these two pipelines and sees the restive Kurdish region as a threat to its plans. It has announced intentions to secure a long-term supply contract with Kirkuk and strongly opposes Kurdish plans to incorporate the city (once claimed by Turkey after WWI) into the semi-autonomous northern Iraqi region. Similarly, Turkey plans to expand trade with Iran, notwithstanding U.S. disapproval. According to the Turkish press, trade has grown from $2.3 billion to $6.7 billion between 2003 and 2006, and the two countries have signed a preferential trade pact on a series of goods. Iran (along with Russia) supplies Turkey its gas needs, which have been growing in pace with the economy.

On the political side, Ankara and Tehran progressively share a cause that unites them – a "war on terror" against the PKK and its Iranian arm, PJAK. For Turkey, the growing attacks by the PKK against Turkish forces are not just acts of terrorism (the U.S. view), but the embodiment of the separatist movement that wants to chip off its southeastern region. Turkey sees duplicity in America's role: the U.S. condemns the PKK, but not PJAK – finding the latter useful for provoking Iran. Hence, Turks overwhelmingly support the military crossing the border – not just to crush the rebels but to commit an act of defiance against the superpower.

As it begins to play a role of regional political power broker, Turkey openly bristles at American sermonizing and patronizing, especially since it correctly warned the U.S. how instability would ripple through the whole region following the Iraq invasion. As a country that criminalizes "insults to Turkishness," it views the recent U.S. congressional effort to recognize as genocide the Ottoman Turks' massacre of Armenians in 1915 to be an irreparable blow to its alliance with the U.S. Fiercely proud of its revolutionary birth and protective of its sovereign borders, the rising crescent will increasingly exert its own will in the region. For the U.S., that means one more miscalculation in a bloody field of failures.

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

Turkey and Azerbaijan Strengthen Economic, Security Ties

20 Nov 2007
World Politics Review Exclusive
Marianna Gurtovnik

The early-November visit to Azerbaijan of the newly elected President of Turkey, Abdullah Gul, highlighted the strategic importance of the Turkey-Azerbaijan relationship and the two countries' common economic and security interests. As such, it attracted much attention in the Azerbaijani media, where analysts happily noted that Azerbaijan was the first country visited by the Turkish leader since he assumed his post in July. As Azerbaijaini political scientist Rustam Mammadov suggested in the wake of the trip, Gul's visit even had implications for the complex political situation unfolding in the Middle East. Speaking to the News - Azerbaijan agency, Mammadov said "the situation in Iran and Iraq as well as Turkey's deteriorated relations with the United States and the European Union require careful consideration on the part of the Turkish leader and his Azerbaijani counterpart."

Fighting the PKK

Indeed, Gul's visit to Azerbaijan occurred amidst events that have prompted Turkey's leaders to shore up support from long-time allies such as Azerbaijan. The Turkish leadership was particularly exercised by the Kurdistan Workers' Party's (PKK) intensified incursions into Turkey. Speaking at a press conference in Baku, Azerbaijan's capital, Gul said that the United States should bear responsibility for the fight against terrorists throughout Iraq and not just in selected provinces. He also told journalists that Turkey expected Azerbaijan's cooperation against the PKK. On Nov. 6, Azerbaijan's parliament, the Milli Majlis, announced its intentions to recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization, a step may help address the Turks' lingering misgivings about the PKK's allegedly deep roots in Azerbaijan.

In light of Turkey's recent spat with Iraqi Kurds, Azerbaijan and Turkey are also worried that the energy security in the region might be jeopardized. Global Insight, a Boston-based economic forecasting publication, last month noted the threat the PKK poses to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline if Turkey pursues retaliatory strikes in Kurdistan. The BTC carries oil from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to Georgia and Turkey. Over half of the pipeline -- 669 of 1,092 miles -- passes through Turkish territory that is home to significant numbers of ethnic Kurds.

The Milli Majlis intends to have a draft statement on the PKK ready before the end of November. But naming the PKK a terrorist organization might have little practical effect given the absence in Azerbaijan of a comprehensive legal, diplomatic, and administrative strategy against terrorism. Until such a plan is in place, Azerbaijan should rely on international anti-terrorism conventions to which Azerbaijan is a party when developing specific measures to combat PKK, says Baku-based political analyst Rauf Mirkadyrov. But he insisted that such measures be fully transparent. "This is necessary in order to avoid the abuse of power by law enforcement officials," Mirkadyrov wrote in a Nov. 9 analysis in the Azerbaijani daily Zerkalo.

Azerbaijani authorities have traditionally taken the threat of terrorism seriously. Earlier this month, local security forces quashed what appeared to be a massive Islamist plot against government offices and the British and American embassies in Baku. Both embassies briefly suspended their operations following the arrest of several suspects and the killing of one member of the terrorist group.

Cultivating Regional Allegiances

Azerbaijani-Turkish relations received another boost last month when Azerbaijan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the resolution to recognize as genocide the early-20th century massacre of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire that was adopted last month by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives. The Azerbaijan Foreign Affairs Ministry's Oct. 12 statement condemned the resolution as "wrong and biased . . . and harmful for the developments in the region and globally." The statement further backed "the Turkish call to examine the archival documents related to the World War I tragedies . . . before taking steps."

The Azerbaijan-Turkey alliance against Armenia dates back to the early 1990s. Following Armenia's occupation of the Azerbaijani enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven adjacent Azerbaijani regions in 1992-1993, Turkey closed its border with Armenia. Turkish officials link the reopening of the border to Armenia's return of the occupied lands to Azerbaijan. Indicative of Turkey's ambitions to assert itself as a regional peacekeeper, President Gul noted earlier this month in an interview with Azerbaijan's Turan news agency that "Ankara is ready to lend its efforts to the maintenance of peace and stability in the South Caucasus region."

Turkey's Economic Designs

Bilateral economic relations represented another prominent item in the Turkish president's agenda in Azerbaijan. Gul and his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, signed several bilateral agreements, including ones pertaining to long-term economic cooperation and mutual economic privileges.

Speaking to the press in Baku, Gul pointed out that over 2,000 Turkish firms have created 50,000 jobs in Azerbaijan and invested $5 billion in Azerbaijan's economy, including the energy sector. To prove his intention to solidify economic ties with Azerbaijan, Gul included 200 Turkish entrepreneurs in his delegation. The move was supposed to mollify Turkish businessmen who complained that Gul's predecessor, Ahmed Necet Sezer, rarely brought them along on his foreign trips. But the change failed to produce the desired effect: Turkey's business elite were disappointed with Gul's choice of small- and medium-sized business owners over the country's top financiers. Their Azerbaijani counterparts appeared to agree. Rashad Rasullu, secretary general of the Baku-based Azerbaijan-Turkey Businessmen Union, believes that Turkey should move more aggressively to avail itself of new investment opportunities in Azerbaijan. In a Nov. 6 interview with the Turkish Daily News, Rasullu said that Azerbaijan "needs help and experience to adapt itself to the rest of the world. Turkey should not miss this chance of becoming a stronger partner."

Gul's rhetoric about "brotherly ties" between the Turks and other regional Muslim nations did not appear to particularly excite Azeris, who have heard such rhetoric many times from Turkish presidents. Yet, lofty speeches aside, Gul did not lack ambitious ideas, and displayed an eagerness to push them forward. In an interview to the Turkish newspaper Today's Zaman prior to flying to Baku, he talked at length about his plans for new energy and transportation networks that will connect Turkey to the South Caucasus and further to Kazakhstan and even China. He said he hoped that a new natural gas pipeline from Baku to the Turkish port of Erzurum via Tbilisi, Georgia, would be completed by the end of 2007, followed, in a few months, by a railway linking Baku and Tbilisi with the Turkish city of Kars. Gul sounded confident that these projects would become a reality soon, citing the example of the BTC pipeline, which became operational in 2005 despite the initial strong doubts about its feasibility.

This is not Turkey's first attempt at economic influence in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. In the mid-1990s, Turkey scaled back an attempt to boost its economic presence in Azerbaijan, partly because of local corruption but also because it lacked the resources to become the regional superpower that it aspired to be. A decade later, Turkey seems to be attempting a comeback. Given the latest turbulent changes across the region and in Turkey itself, it is now in greater need of strong alliances with its neighbors. Whether President Gul's Administration will be successful at forging these alliances remains to be seen.

Marianna Gurtovnik is a freelance analyst based in the United States. She covers governance reforms, foreign policy, and civil society developments in the Newly Independent States.

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

Carrying A Big Stick

Published: 11/19/2007
Turkish Press, MI

BY SAMIL TAYYAR
AKSAM- President Abdullah Gul’s three-day visit to Azerbaijan ended yesterday. The call made by Gul to Armenia during the visit was very important. Some in Armenia might believe he was carrying a big stick, but his visit was important for reflecting the real political situation in the region. In addition to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, taken together the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas line, the railway extending to Kars and the forthcoming Marmaray connecting the European and Asian sides of Istanbul under the Bosporus will constitute a strategic energy, transportation and communication corridor from China to Europe . In Gul’s words, you could get on a train in China , enter Turkey from Kars and then, after passing under the Bosporus, proceed to Europe , also on train. In addition, oil and gas from the Caucasus will be able to be transported to Europe via Turkey . Let’s add Turkey ’s possible European Union membership to this as well. These huge projects will have a big impact on the entire region, but an atmosphere of peace and stability is necessary towards this end. Those who can’t accept the key role to be played by Turkey in the years to come might want to sabotage this atmosphere. Terrorist attacks and the so-called Armenian genocide claims can be seen as part of this.


Gul said this to Armenia : If you want to take your share in the region, then you have to join this caravan. In other words, either stay poor or get rich. But throughout the long history of the Caucasus region, not even the most steadfast ruler has reigned for more than 50 years. This is a region that has seen fierce clashes. The 70 years of the Soviet Union was an exception. When Gul put Sheikh Shamil’s sword in his hand at the Gence Art Museum , he said, ‘As this is the Caucasus , the sword should always rest ready in its scabbard.’ In other words, you could face a threat anytime, so you should be careful. Turkey is aware of this, and the world is aware of Turkey . Particularly after the option of a cross-border operation by Turkey into Iraq came up, people are paying more attention to Turkey . Moreover, Turkey has made its power felt on the international stage as a global actor.


The Saudi king will arrive in Turkey today. In addition, the Jordanian king, Israeli President Shimon Peres and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas will all visit Ankara next week. Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora is also due to visit. During the upcoming Middle East conference, regional problems will be discussed but these bilateral contacts in Ankara are important for evaluating regional problems from a different perspective. Meanwhile, Gul says that everybody knows the importance placed on Turkey . But Turkey isn’t watching on the sidelines from Ankara . The fact that during Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to the US this week Gul also paid his first official visit to Azerbaijan , and even visited Gence –the first such visit for a Turkish statesmen to this place, just 60 kilometers from Armenia -- is rich with meaning.


Gul will visit Turkmenistan early next month. In addition, there are plans for visits to Uzbekistan , Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan as well. We used to call these regions our brothers, but then a new concept of relationship was developed. Gul defined it by saying that if you act only with excitement, you won’t accomplish anything, and so you must fuse enthusiasm and pragmatism. Meanwhile, Turkey ’s EU membership bid hasn’t been forgotten. On this issue, Gul said that the important thing for Turkey to know its needs and implement reforms. He added that if only this had been done and membership talks had started earlier, the situation would have been different. He’s quite right, but we should stop being mired in the past. If Turkey can continue this vision, Turkey will become a global country with a huge impact on world politics. Imagine you’re a country in the middle of a strategic corridor extending from China to Europe, an EU member, and the Caucasus is the EU’s neighbor. Some people might call this a dream. But today such huge projects as the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which yesterday was only a dream, are a reality. The foundation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway will be laid next year. As Gul said, if we can cast away the shackles in our minds, new dreams will come true in the years to come.

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

Turkey as a Regional Power

October 23, 2007 20 30 GMT
Stratfor
By George Friedman

If Turkey is on its way to become a regional power as the article below says, it is more important for the world to stand up to the Turkish denial of the Armenian genocide. Turkey will only seek stability through domination. It already knows which ropes to pull to get its own way. America was largely behind making Turkey what it is today. America is now reduced to begging Turkey to keep the regional stability. What a reversal in fortunes this is. And this is just the beginning. If this is not a wake up call for America I do not know what is.

[...]it is difficult to imagine that the Turks won't move into northern Iraq and re-establish the sphere of influence and security they had during the Saddam Hussein era. The United States is working furiously to satisfy Turkey by taking responsibility for controlling the PKK. It is not clear whether the United States can deliver, nor is it clear whether the Turks are prepared to rely on the United States. Some move into Iraq is likely, in our mind, but even if it doesn't happen in this particular case, tensions between Turkey and the United States will remain. More important, Turkey's willingness to play a secondary role in the region is declining.

[...] the Turks did not want a rupture with the United States -- given that the relationship has been the foundation of Turkish foreign policy since World War II. The refusal of the European Union to admit Turkey in particular made it necessary for Ankara to preserve its relationship with Washington. Therefore, although the invasion was problematic for the Turks, they have cooperated with the United States, allowing a large portion of the supplies for U.S. troops in Iraq to come through Turkey.

[...] Turkey's perception is that it already is dealing with the post-war world, one in which an increasingly bold Iraqi Kurdistan is pursuing a policy of expanding Kurdish autonomy by facilitating a guerrilla war in Turkey. The PKK's actions in recent weeks confirm this view in their mind. They also believe they cannot deal with the Kurdish challenge defensively, and therefore they must defend by attacking. Hence, the creation of a security zone in Iraq.

From the Kurds' point of view, if there ever was a moment to assert their national rights, this is it. However, their highly risky gamble is that the United States will not chance an anti-American uprising in Iraq's Kurdish areas and so will limit the extent to which Turkey can intervene. Moreover, with the United States at odds with Iran, it might support a Kurdish uprising there. Hence, though the stakes are high, the Kurdish gamble is not irrational.

The Kurds in Iraq are correct in their view that the United States does not want conflict in the one area in Iraq that is not anti-American. They also are correct that this is a unique moment for them. But they are betting that the Turks don't recognize the danger and thus will place their interests second to those of the United States -- which is more concerned with stability in Iraqi Kurdistan than with suppressing attacks in Turkey's Kurdish areas. Although this might have been true of Turkey 10 years ago, it no longer is true today. The U.S.-Turkish relationship has flipped. The United States needs Turkey more than Turkey needs the United States -- for reasons beyond getting supplies to Iraq.

[...] Turkey and Iran have a common interest in preventing an independent Kurdish nation anywhere, the more the United States supports the Iraqi Kurds, the greater the danger of an Iranian-Turkish alliance. At the moment, that is the last thing the United States wants to see, which is why the resolution on Turkish responsibility for Armenian genocide in the U.S. Congress could not possibly have come at a worse moment.

[...] Turkey is the heir to the Ottoman Empire, which at various points dominated the eastern Mediterranean, North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, the Caucasus and deep into Russia. Its collapse after World War I created an oddity -- an inward-looking state in Asia Minor. Cautious in World War II and strictly aligned with the United States during the Cold War, Turkey played a passive role: It either sat things out or allowed its strategic territory to be used.

The situation has changed dramatically. [...] Turkey should be viewed as a rapidly emerging regional power -- or, in the broadest sense, as beginning the process of recreating a regional hegemon of enormous strategic power, based in Asia Minor but projecting political, economic and military forces in a full circle. Its willingness to rely on the United States to guarantee its national security ended in 2003. It is prepared to cooperate with the United States on issues of mutual interest, but not as a subordinate power.

[...]

Its current stance on the Kurdish issue is merely a first step. What makes that position important is that Turkey is pursuing its interests indifferent to European or American views. Additionally, the reversal of dependency between the United States and Turkey is ultimately more important than whether Turkey goes into Iraq. The U.S. invasion of Iraq kicked off many processes in the world and created many windows of opportunity. Watching Turkey make its moves, we wonder less about the direction it is going than about the limits of its ambition.

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

Iran - Turkey rivalry boosts Russia's influence

Tuesday, September 25, 2007
EnerPub, TX

A closer look at Turkish-Iranian rivalry in Central Asia and the Caucasus and its impact on Russia

by Michael Alguire

While the global news media has given extensive coverage to the geopolitics of energy resources in the former Soviet Empire, little attention has been paid to the competition between Turkey and Iran in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and its impact on Russia.

Firstly, Russia’s fear of a rising Turkic nationalism among its Turkic minorities has been one of the factors that have led Russia to seek an alliance of convenience with Iran. Secondly, while competition for spheres of influence in the Caucasian and Central Asian regions exists between all three powers (Russia, Turkey, and Iran), Turkey’s alignment with the West on energy issues has served to create a common interest between Russia and Iran in preventing the emergence of Turkish and Western dominance over Caspian Sea energy resources. Finally, Russia appears to be using ethnic tensions in the Caucasus to secure its dominance of the region, and prevent the European Union (EU), the United State (U.S.), Turkey, and Iran from bypassing Russia in their quest for energy resources.

The origins of the Turkish-Iranian rivalry lie in the competition for hegemony in the Middle East between the Ottoman and Persian empires under Persia's Safavid (1501-1724) and Qajar (1795-1925) dynasties. From the late 19th century onward, several new factors emerged that affected the nature of the rivalry. Firstly, during the late 19th and early 20th century, there was the emergence of the ideology of Pan-Turkism (which strives for the cultural and physical unity of all peoples of Turkic origins). The second factor was the founding of the present-day Republic of Turkey as a secular state under the country’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, in the aftermath of the First World War. The final factor was the Iranian revolution of 1979 that transformed Iran into an Islamic theocracy. All of these elements coalesced to define the renewed Turkish-Iranian rivalry that began with the formation of the states that compose the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS states) in the aftermath of collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The Soviet Union’s collapse left a power vacuum in Central Asia and Azerbaijan that was quickly filled by Iran and Turkey. The rivalry between the two countries has two-dimensions: firstly, each promotes its own form of government i.e. Turkey advocates secular democracy, while Iran promotes its model of Islamic government. The second dimension involves the exploitation of ethnic and linguistic ties. Turkey promotes Pan-Turkism, patronizing the Turkic-speaking populations of Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; Iran has attempted to extend its influence into Tajikistan, whose inhabitants are culturally Iranian and speak an eastern dialect of Persian. More recently, Turkey has voiced its opposition to the Iran’s alleged quest for nuclear weapons. This rivalry has multiple implications for Russia, particularly with regard to Turkey’s position in this contest.

To begin with, the ideology of Pan-Turkism was created by Turkic groups like the Crimean Tartars living in Russia during the late 19th and early 20th centuries as a response to efforts by the Russian state to assimilate them into Russian culture. Russia feared a revival of this ideology after 1991. The present-day Russian Federation has significant Turkic minorities living within its borders, and an upsurge in Pan-Turkism could lead certain regions, such as Tataristan, Baskirdistan, and Yakutistan, to seek independence. Turkey is also a long-standing ally of the United States, and the U.S. has been trying to extend its influence into the former Soviet empire (and particularly the energy-rich Caspian Sea region), since the early 1990s. Furthermore, Turkey has also been working closely with the EU in efforts to create a natural gas pipeline running from Central Asia across the Caspian Sea, through Azerbaijan and Turkey into the Mediterranean, thereby reducing the EU’s dependence on Russian energy pipelines. In 2006, the EU and Turkey announced the approval of Nabucco gas pipeline, which is scheduled to begin construction in 2008 and will route the gas of the Caspian region through Azerbaijan to Austria, via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. The pipeline is scheduled to start transporting gas in 2011.

Yet Russia has managed to match this achievement. On May 12, 2007, the governments of Russia, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan announced plans to construct a natural gas pipeline that will pump gas from Turkmenistan through Kazakhstan to Russia. Russia already buys Turkmen gas at below-market levels, and also effectively controls Turkmenistan’s gas reserves through its network of Soviet-era pipelines owned by Russian energy giant Gazprom.

Thus, this newest pipeline will both increase Russia’ controls over Turkmen gas reserves, as well as allow Russia to continue exporting its own gas to Europe more profitably. While Russia has won an important victory in the competition for Caspian region resources, the struggle for these resources continues, particularly in the Caucasus. In that region, Russia, Turkey, and Iran either have used or appear to still be using ethnic tensions as a means to impede their competitors’ ability to gain a solid handle on energy resources. These ethnic tensions have a complex history.

After taking power in late 1917, Vladimir Lenin appointed Joseph Stalin as the Commissar of Nationalities, responsible for carrying out the new government’s policies towards the former Russian empire’s numerous nationalities. Both Lenin and Stalin were committed to retaining as much of the empire as possible, and Stalin adopted the policy of “divide and rule,” setting boundaries of the Soviet republics in such a way as to leave large ethnic minorities in each republic, separating ethnic groups across two or more republics. These minorities would then serve as fifth column inside these republics, preventing a particular republic from separating from the Soviet Union in order to avoid potentially harsh treatment under a particular independent republic’s ethnic majority. Such was the case with the three breakaway regions in the Caucasus: Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan.

Abkhazia was incorporated into Georgia in 1931 by Stalin, and in 1992 the Abkhaz began fighting for independence from Georgia (allegedly with Russian assistance), which they declared in 1993. A CIS peacekeeping force composed mostly of Russian soldiers has been stationed in the region since 1994, and Russia continues to use a military base at Gudauta, despite a 1999 treaty that committed the Russians to abandoning the base. Russia has made it easy for residents of Abkhazia to obtain Russian passports, which most people now hold. In addition, the Russian ruble is widely used in the region.

South Ossetia, the other region which has broken from Georgia, was originally part of a united Ossetia that was divided between the Georgian and Russian republics by the Soviet authorities in the 1920s. The Ossetian struggle for independence from Georgia began in 1989, ending in 1992 with an agreement for the deployment of Russian, Georgian, and Ossetian peacekeepers in South Ossetia. Russian peacekeepers remain in the region today, although the Georgian parliament has called for them to be replaced with an international force.

As in Abkhazia, most South Ossetians have Russian passports and the Russian ruble is commonly used in trade. In January 2006, the Georgian government accused Russia of orchestrating several explosions on a gas pipeline in North Ossetia, thereby sabotaging Georgia’s main gas pipeline. The Georgians claimed that this operation was carried out in response to the Georgian parliament’s demand that Russian troops be removed from South Ossetia. Russia claimed that the explosions were carried out by pro-Chechen insurgents. Russia has also pressured Georgia to sell its pipeline network to Gazprom. The Russian military presence in Georgia proper will end in 2008, when Russia will vacate its two remaining military bases inside the country. However, so long as Russia maintains its troops in these breakaway regions and supports their separatist governments, it will be able to preserve its sphere of influence in this part of the Caucasus as well as compete with the United States (which is providing training and support to the Georgian military) and Turkey (which serves as an exit point for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline that transports oil under Georgia). Russia will also be able to counter any Iranian initiatives in the area.

Finally, there is the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabkh, a de facto independent region that is surrounded by Azerbaijan’s territory. Like Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Soviet authorities established the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region within Azerbaijan in the early 1920s as part of a policy of “divide and rule.” The Region was populated predominantly by Armenians, and Armenian discontent with this situation smoldered throughout the Soviet period. Ethnic Armenian-Azeri frictions exploded into further violence in the late 1980s. As the violence escalated, the ethnic Azeri population fled Nagorno-Karabkh and Armenia, while ethnic Armenians fled the rest of Azerbaijan. Outside powers used these ethnic tensions to their advantage.

Both Russia and Iran were angered by the staunchly pro-Turkish stance which the Azeri government adopted in its foreign and domestic policies following independence, policies which were formulated on the basis of the Azeris being a Turkic ethnic group. Russia wished to maintain its long-standing influence in the country. Iran wished to use a common religious heritage (both Azerbaijan and Iran have Shi’a Muslim majorities) to influence the country. It also strove to prevent the rise of a strong Azerbaijan that could push for unification with Iran’s own large Azeri population.

In pursuit of these goals, both Iran and Russia provided encouragement and financing to ethnic communities inside Azerbaijan that were resisting the government’s policy of “Turkification.” To a certain extent, this included the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabkh. The Nagorno-Karabkh conflict ended in 1994 with the signing of a Russian-backed ceasefire that left Nagorno-Karabkh under ethnic Armenian control. Sporadic fighting has occurred since the ceasefire, and in December 2006 the territory held a referendum in which 98% of the voters supported a constitution that declares the region to be sovereign state that is completely independent of Azerbaijan.

This development is interesting in light of the fact that Russia still operates a military base in Armenia itself. Furthermore, in April 2006, Russia purchased Armenia’s pipelines and a power plant in exchange for setting domestic Armenian gas prices at half of European levels until 2009. This deal also gives Russia control of a pipeline which runs from Iran into Armenia, allowing Russia further influence over Iranian policy in the Caucasus. The Armenians welcome the Russian military presence as a counterweight to its western neighbor and diplomatic foe, Turkey. Thus, given that Armenia is already a diplomatic ally of Russia, and in spite of Azeri government’s insistence that the referendum was illegal, a resolutely independent Nagorno-Karabkh could serve as a client state for the Russians inside Azerbaijan, in the same way that Abkhazia and South Ossetia appear to be serving as its client states in Georgia.

All of these separatist regions allow Russia to maintain its influence throughout the Caucasus in absence of the direct territorial control it enjoyed in the Soviet era. This apparent policy of “divide and conquer” may eventually lead to Russia gaining near complete control of the energy resources of Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. Thus, while the Turkish-Iranian rivalry has helped to make Russia and Iran allies of convenience, Russia’s policy of “divide and conquer” in the Caucasus could lead to Iran losing the battle for definitive control of the Caspian region’s energy resources.

Michael Alguire is a political analyst and Trinity College Scholar, who recently completed a Specialist Program in History at the University of Toronto. This was published at Robert Amsterdam's site, "Perspectives on Russia, Europe, and International Affairs."

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

Armenian Author Publishes Book on Turkish Expansion in Georgia

July 19, 2007
Messenger.ge, Georgia

By M. Alkhazashvili
(Translated by Diana Dundua)

A new book on Georgian and Turkish economic relations, written by an assistant professor at Yerevan State Institute of Economics, was published in Moscow.

Ashot Egiazaryan’s “Georgia: Structural Problems of the Economy and Turkish Economic Expansion (1994–2007)” claims that the current Tbilisi administration looks at Turkey as an alternative to Russia for trade and investment.

This warm reception gives Turkey an opportunity to widen its influence in Georgia and the South Caucasus, writes the Armenian author.

Egiazaryan argues that the Caucasus and Central Asia are a priority for Turkey’s foreign economic policy, reports the news agency Regnum, with a strong focus on developing transit links across the continent.

Turkey reoriented its transit tactics in the early 90s, pushing for new railways and increasing port infrastructure.

Istanbul is paying particular attention to the Kars–Akhalkalaki railway, which is set to connect the South Caucasian rail networks (notably bypassing Armenia), allowing for unimpeded rail transit from Asia to Europe.

According to Egiazaryan, this railway will actually reduce Georgia’s importance as a transcontinental transit state

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

Khachik Ter-Ghukassian : If Turkey succeeds Armenia will be isolated from the world

Jul 17, 2007
European Armenian Federation, Belgium

Developments in the Near East can change the balance of forces in the region and influence on Armenia’s relations with Turkey and Iran. The main player in the region is the U.S., which is interested in stability in the Near East and Caucasus. This power’s wish to push Russia from the South Caucasus, specifically from Armenia, is also an important factor. Professor of international relations and politics of the Universidad de San Andrés in Buenos Aires, Dr Khachik Ter-Ghukassian comments to PanARMENIAN.Net on the ongoing events in the region and their possible impact on Armenia.

The international community attaches big importance to the events taking place in the Neat East. How do you assess the current situation?

The Near East is of great interest for Washington. It specifically refers to the Caucasus. The U.S. is perfectly aware that war with Iran will redouble instability in the region while Washington needs “an arc of stability” from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea. First of all, it concerns oil. The U.S. stands for cooperation but the situation is tensed, if not explosive. Although, Washington has intentions to improve relations with Iran.

However, certain difficulties may cause internal developments in the Caucasus. It’s quite possible that the map of the Near East may change. Anyway, there are some preconditions for it. The U.S. plans a “mild” division of Iraq with further formation of independent Kurdistan. At the same time I should stress that U.S. presence in Iraq doesn’t alleviate tension. Unfortunately, the Arab world lacks either political or intellectual force capable to change the situation.

Normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relations becomes more urgent for the United States. Can Washington have its will?

At the moment Turkey’s foreign policy is targeted at Northern Iraq and improvement of relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan, what includes development of communications and military-strategic partnership. If Turkey’s succeeds in realizing its plans Armenia will be isolated from the world. Curiously enough, such state of things is not convenient for the U.S. which insists on opening of the Armenian-Turkish border. However, normalization of relations without preconditions is a dangerous tendency. Turkey doesn’t open the border proceeding from political reasons: the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, the Armenian Genocide and absence of fixed border with Armenia. The only legal basis for demarcation of borders is the Sevr Treaty. No agreement signed after Sevr, namely the Kars and Moscow treaties, do not have juridical effect, since the signatory powers stopped their existence as elements of international law. The Sevr Treaty was signed August 10, 1920. Borders with independent Armenia had to be marked by a neutral mediator, namely the United States, according to it.

At that we should not forget that Turkey has always been the biggest danger for the Armenian people. This opinion should be shared by the whole nation, both in Armenia and Diaspora. On the other hand, opening of borders can tell on Armenia’s economy. Georgia, where the local industry was destroyed because of the abundant flow of cheap Turkish goods, can serve as an example. Certainly, Armenian economy can’t compete with the Turkish, but we will have an outlet to the world, at least. Although, we are not ready to make a reality of the scenario we will be offered.

Iran and Armenia enjoy lasting and friendly ties. How would you comment on them?

If the United States collides with Turkey over Northern Iraq and simultaneously improves relations with Iran, it will be the best scenario for Armenia. Actually, under circumstances Russia’s presence as a security guarantor for Armenia will lose urgency. We should strengthen relations with Iran.

Iran is a minority in the Islamic world, since it practices Shi’ism. This state is the potential regional power. Will Washington have a political force to hold a dialogue with Iran as equals? This is the core of the problem. How the balance will be maintained between the Sunnis (al Qaeda) and Shiites? How the Lebanese problem will be resolved. These are questions that need exact answers. Under any circumstances, the Armenia-Iran relations should be apart any shocks in the region.

220 members of the House of Representatives have supported the Armenian Genocide Resolution. Do you think it will be put on vote?

The U.S. government will use the H.Res.106 as the main took of pressure on Turkey. Struggle between Democrats and Republicans as well as the presidential elections in the United States may speed up or, on the contrary, protract the decision. If Washington is really interested in normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relations it will press on Turkey with this Resolution. As to the opinion, that passage of the Armenian Genocide Resolution is necessary for the Armenian community of the U.S., I am convinced that opposing Armenia and Diaspora in the Genocide issue is dangerous and immoral.

Argentina is among the states that recognized the Armenian Genocide. How efficient are the activities of the Armenian community of Argentina?

Argentina is the second, after France, state where the Armenian Genocide is recognized on the legislative level. The history of the Genocide is a compulsory subject in schools of Buenos Aires. The Hay Dat Argentinean Office has organized a special textbook. It also holds seminars for school teachers.

I would like to note that Venezuela, which is far enough from the major states of South America, has also recognized the Armenian Genocide. In the 1980-ies Armenians of Argentina and other South American states started integration into in the society. We have become a part of the countries, which gave us shelter. We should proceed on this way basing on the example of the Armenian community of France.

I should also mention that the first sitting of the South American Parliament will take place July 21. Three states – Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay – have agreed on forming the structure with the capital in Montevideo. Our work will become more coordinated.

PanARMENIAN.Net


source: PanARMENIAN

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

Undisclosed Georgian-American Secrets: History Has More to Tell about Moser

Daily Georgian Times, Georgia - Jun 4, 2007

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia, and the emergence of the Soviet Union on the ruins of the Russian Empire prompted the United States’ appearance on the geopolitical arena. The US had it has its own agenda for the future of the region, and in 1919, the US State Department developed a strategy of how to deal with the former Russian Empire. The US wanted to see the South Caucasian republics—Ukraine, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Crimea, Karelia, Murmansky—districted as separate territorial units independent of Russia. To carry out this strategy, the US needed a foothold in the territory of the former Russian Empire. It chose the South Caucasus as its plaform.

Aleksi Chokheli, a candidate of sciences of history, has been looking at the geopolitical games of this period. Chokheli says that accepting former colonies of the Turkish (Ottoman) and Russian Empire, and also those of Germany (which was defeated in World War I) under the status of the so-called ‘interim mandates’ was an expression of the “common democratic spirit of the world.”

In South Caucasus, the allies of the World War I offered an interim mandate to Armenia. The mandate was intended to secure the Armenian state. At the time, Georgian authorities were trying to have the US mandate extended to Georgia as well.

The Georgian Times interviewed Chokheli about this period of history.

Q: History shows what a fiasco Europe and the US experienced in their attempts to protect the South Caucasian states from Russian invasion. They were left all alone in the face of Russia. The US even failed to implement its mandate over Armenia.

A: A number of objective reasons can be cited to explain why this happened. But I will now dwell on the role of the US consulate in Georgia, which was spearheading the US policy in the South Caucasus. More specifically, I will talk about its last boss, consul Charles Moser. He witnessed the political turmoil that wracked Georgia in those two years of crisis. I would say that that his performance, and even his personality, shows the moderate course of the US that proved so fatal for South Caucasus, including Georgia.

It is hard to say whether it was due to his political intuition or pragmatic far-sighted policy, but history shows that the US established its own consulate in Batumi even before World War I started, and when the US joined the war, the consulate moved to Tbilisi.

The consulate served as a department of the General Consulate based in Moscow, and after the demise of the Russian Empire, it was subordinated directly to the US State Department. Following the invasion of Georgia by the Tsarist Russian Empire the US consulate officially moved to Constantinople, but in fact it stopped functioning.

Q: Did the US consulate serve as embassy as well, or was it strictly limited to consulate duties?

A: It is rather obvious that when there is no embassy in a country, the consulate assumes embassy status. The activity of the first consul of the US to Georgia W. Smith is evidence of this. He served in Georgia until June of 1919.

At that time, Tbilisi was a cultural and political hub in the South Caucasus. Prime Minister of Armenia Khatisov—who once had even served as Tbilisi Mayor—was based in Tbilisi and running Armenia from Georgia, as his wife did not want to live in “remote” Yerevan.

Smith, who was born into a family of Americans residing somewhere in the South Caucasus (perhaps even in Tbilisi), adapted to his new position perfectly. He was well versed in the ethnic structure of the South Caucasus and knew many political figures personally. Smith was the ideal person to implement US policy in the South Caucasus as the Russian empire was about to crumble.

In 1917, 1918 and in the first half 1919, the Atlantic States and the US had two major issues on the agenda: to prevent Bolshevism from taking over South Caucasus, and bring this region within the spheres of its influence in the aftermath of World War I. These interests even caused a latent diplomatic clash at Paris peace conference. The documents giving evidence to this confrontation is widely covered in American historic editions and the activity of the American consul to Tbilisi W. Smith is granted its due place on these pages.

Reading the correspondence of Smith with high-ranking American officials, one is astonished by his energetic and rather bold proposals to the US Administration. Smith requested millions of dollars to fund the South Caucasus commissariat (a federal government of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1917-1918), tried to create a joint Georgian-Armenian army of 150 000 soldiers, and worked on many other initiatives in order to try and save the region, including Georgia, from the Bolshevik invasion.

Q: Smith was recalled in summer 1919, when Charles Moser replaced him. Moser’s memoirs are full of strong impressions about his personal life, but he left almost no official document that would shed light on his diplomatic work – something of more interest to us.

A: That is because he managed to concoct his memoirs to smartly avoid talking about his diplomatic work. As for his correspondence, his letters to the US State Department and other business communications have never been published. Moreover, these were written in a code that other consulates were using.

We can only speculate about why the documents related to Moser’s political activity were not decoded and published. At the Paris peace conference in 1919, the US and England made a deal and divided the South Caucasus into discrete spheres of influence. The UK took over Georgia, while giving Armenia’s mandate to the US. Following the deal, the status of the American consulate in Tbilisi underwent a major change. On July 5 of 1919, the Supreme Council of the allies in Paris appointed American colonel Haskel as the High Commissioner for Armenia, and the US Department delegated the management of the US consulate in Tbilisi to Haskel.

The American colonel settled in Yerevan. Political changes have somewhat bleached the importance of the US consulate and the US consul in Tbilisi. Perhaps Moser’s documents also reflected the Smith-style independent and bold consul policies. This still remains mystery.

The only document that has been unsealed is Moser’s answer to Armenia which was kept in Georgia’s archives. Armenians expected that the US would protect them from Turkey, and applied to the US consul with this request. Replying to the request, Moser wrote: “Although the US recognized the republic of Armenia and helped it as it could, the US administration never assumed an obligation to protect the Armenian people or to provide military support. Therefore, it cannot take responsibility [for dealing with] the current crisis.” The letter shows the restrained position of the US in implementing the mandate of Armenia. On the other hand, the letter suggests that the US consul took a low-key position in his diplomacy work in the South Caucasus.

Q: Moser’s memoirs show that he knew and liked Georgia and Georgians but there was no love lost between him and Georgian authorities. What was the cause of disagreement?

A: Before arriving in Georgia as a professional diplomat Charles Moser—who had experience of diplomatic work in Central and Far East—tried to become familiar with the nation with which he was to live and work for some time. He was not satisfied by reading books and travel guides, and began to obtain information from live sources.

With this purpose to mind, he met with former ambassador of Russia, King Maklakov. “[Maklakov] described Georgians as attractive people, people who loved merry-making,” Moser recalled. “[As people] who reveal big talent whenever they need it, but will never get to business which they do not like.”

“Georgians are a beautiful nation, both women and men (which I would certainly discover myself). They are proud and sensitive. It is easy to offend them but they would never delay their response, even using arms. Georgians wear long swords just for appearance but they become dangerous... I was always to bear in my mind that Georgians love wine, women and song, dance and even quarrel.”

Moser arrived one nice day in January 1920 with these impressions. But soon after his arrival, a misunderstanding dampened his excitement over Georgia. At a presentation given by the consulate, Georgia’s Foreign Minister Yevgeni Gegechkori gave the US consul the cold shoulder. Historians do not know the reason for the cold reception that reversed Moser’s course.

Following that fateful meeting, the new consul reduced his contacts with the Georgian government, and began to support foreigners in their diplomatic disputes with the government of Georgia. Sometimes he would even encourage a hostile attitude towards the government of Georgia from the diplomatic corp.

Distrust of the social-democratic government of Georgia grew dangerous in character. In official documentation Moser used to describe Georgia as a ‘socialist republic,’ which was a gross mischaracterization.

The deeply disappointed consul withdrew into his private life. Moser then married the daughter of Georgian noble Sidamon Eristavi. The only good thing that he did for Georgians was to evacuate Sidamon Eristavi and his relatives when the Bolsheviks lay siege to Georgia.

Nonetheless, we think that Moser’s devotion to private life was not the whole story. He closely followed the dramatic developments in the South Caucasus. Working on his secret heritage may fill the gaps in the history of Georgian-American relations with many interesting and important facts, and who knows? They may even change our present opinion on the activity of the US consul in Tbilisi.

Ramaz Kartvelishvili
2007.06.04 17:03


Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

Another theater for US-Iran fallout: the South Caucasus

May 21, 2007
Christian Science monitor
By Nicole Itano Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor


Armenia, an ally of both countries, shows how tensions between the two could upset the region's diplomatic balancing act.


ARMENIA - In late March, as the United Nations Security Council debated whether to increase sanctions against Iran over that country's refusal to halt its nuclear program, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his Armenian counterpart met near the border of the two countries to inaugurate a new pipeline bringing Iranian natural gas to fuel Armenian cities.

Lighting a symbolic flame, Armenian President Robert Kocharian called the ceremony "evidence of our friendship." But it's a relationship some of Armenia's other friends – particularly the US – wish weren't quite so cozy.

As tensions between Iran and the West approach a boiling point, Armenia is finding it increasingly difficult to negotiate the often conflicting alliances in its complicated neighborhood. Its precarious position illustrates the potentially destabilizing consequences of a Western standoff with Iran on not only the Middle East, but the South Caucasus as well.

More than 15 years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the fragile region remains politically volatile. A number of unresolved conflicts – over the breakaway regions of Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia – still poison relations between neighbors.

Those local tensions have been amplified by new global focus on the region that has placed the countries at a nexus of competing interests. Russia, the US, the European Union, Turkey, and Iran all claim important economic or political stakes in the region.

Armenia faces a choice: Iran or the US?

Keeping good relations with Iran is vital for Armenia, a small, landlocked country. Its main borders – with Turkey and Azerbaijan – are closed, and the country is still in a state of cold war with neighboring Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, an unrecognized ethnically Armenian state that is still legally part of Muslim Azerbaijan.

But the US is Armenia's main donor and the only one which currently funds humanitarian assistance in Karabakh. Over the next five years, Armenia is also slated to receive $235 million in aid through President Bush's flagship international development program, the new Millennium Challenge Account.

Armenia's outgoing foreign minister, Vartan Oskanian, says Armenia's allies understand its difficult position. But he also acknowledges that, as tensions rise, there is increasing pressure to choose a side.

"In the case of Iran and the United States, I think we're reaching that point," says Mr. Oskanian, who is Syrian-born and earned a masters degree at Tufts University in Medford, Mass.

Analysts say military conflict with Iran would be devastating for the region and many here fear that its effects could spill over into Iran's neighbors in the South Caucasus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

"God forbid, if there is military action against Iran, Armenia may get involved. And Azerbaijan as well," says Stiopa Safarian, director of research at the Armenian Center for National and International Studies, a think tank connected to the opposition Heritage Party.

In the worst-case scenario, Mr. Safarian says, it could reignite conflict between the two countries, which still stare each other down across disputed and heavily militarized cease-fire line near Iran.

Armenia spends $250 to $300 million a year on its military, largely because of the unsolved Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijan spends more than three times that.

But politicians also worry that even if the current conflict stops short of military intervention, heightened tension between Iran and the West could shatter the delicate diplomatic balancing act in the region.

Armenia and Azerbaijan both have close ties to the United States and Iran, although Christian Armenia's ties have been steadier with Iran.

Despite Iran's sometimes tense relations with Azerbaijan, many analysts say the country plays a key balancing role in the region. Iran steadies relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan and counterbalances the influence of Russia, a key regional power.

So far, a balance

So far, Armenia has been able to steer a middle course between the US and Iran. It has stayed largely silent on Iran's nuclear policy, but kept its economic ties with the country transparent and – along with Azerbaijan – quietly enforced international nonproliferation agreements.

But the US is concerned about the growing economic ties between Armenia and its neighbor, particularly the new pipeline, which Armenians see as strategically vital.

Armenia has no energy resources of its own and suffered severe energy shortages in the early 1990s as a result of the civil war in neighboring Georgia.

"Armenia was dependent on pipelines that passed through several countries," says Serzh Sarkisian, who recently became Armenia's prime minister. "We remember what the situation was in Armenia when that pipe was out of order. Imagine sitting in Yerevan in January and you have no heat, no water, and it was minus 30 degrees Celsius."

Given Iran's economic importance to Armenia, though, few here believe that Armenia can do anything other than continue to claim neutrality for as long as possible. But beneath Armenia's steady relationship with Iran, there is also wariness in the country about its neighbor's behavior.

"It's very simple. I don't think that anyone in Armenia would be happy if next to their borders they would have weapons of mass destruction," says Mr. Sarkisian.

Tomorrow: A look at US efforts to leverage Iran's disgruntled ethnic Azeri population to foster change from within the country.


Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

SERGEY IVANOV: ARMENIA IS RUSSIA'S STRATEGIC PARTNER

"If you ask my personal view, I can answer since I am familiar very well with the matter - I have often visited Armenia in last six or seven years of my work at defense ministerial post. I think Armenia is our strategic partner. This is gauged not only by military and political interest", he said.

Ivanov also stressed that Russia and Armenia have been tied by common culture for centuries.

YEREVAN, April 11. /ARKA/. Armenia is Russia's strategic partner, Russian First Deputy PM Sergey Ivanov said Wednesday answering journalists' question whether Armenia is Russia's strategic partner or stronghold.

"If you ask my personal view, I can answer since I am familiar very well with the matter - I have often visited Armenia in last six or seven years of my work at defense ministerial post. I think Armenia is our strategic partner. This is gauged not only by military and political interest", he said.

Ivanov also stressed that Russia and Armenia have been tied by common culture for centuries.

Speaking about military cooperation, he said that Russia has a military base in Armenia. In his words, the troops deployed in Armenia feel themselves comfortable here and secure both Russian and Armenian interests.

Ivanov said that the military base presence here is not directed against other states, but "ensure our joint security, since we are CSTO members".

He said Armenia and Russia are partners and allies and pointed out Russian Defense Ministry's school in Armenia as convincing evidence of that.

In his words, he together with Armenian Prime Minister Serge Sargsyan visited the school today.

Ivanov expressed gratitude to Armenian leadership and to Serge Sargsyan personally for their care of the school.

He thinks the school is in very good state and Russian military and their families feel themselves comfortable here.

Ivanov also pointed out that besides military cooperation there are also economic and cultural ties and Russian language is a factor making these ties closer.

The Armenian Prime Minister, in his turn, said that the statement about "stronghold" a mere misunderstanding.

"Somebody wanted to take advantage from this and the man who said that wanted to say something good, but said the first thing that came to his mind", Sargsyan said.

Russia's State Duma Speaker Boris Grizlov said during his visit to Armenia in December 2004 that "Armenia is Russia's stronghold in South Caucasus". M.V.-0--

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

Will Armenia turn orange?

11/ 04/ 2007
RIA Novosti

MOSCOW. (Political analyst Nikolai Vavilkin for RIA Novosti) - This year will be one of the most important in Armenia's post-Soviet independent history.

With the parliamentary election set for May 2007 and the presidential election for March 2008, this South Caucasian republic is in for 12 months of intense election battles.

The winner of the presidential race could be determined by the parliamentary election. Under the 2005 constitution, the party that wins control of parliament will nominate the prime minister and the speaker, and will have an opportunity to fight for the presidency in 2008.

Presidential elections in all former Soviet republics carry the risk of political upheavals. There has not been a change of power at all in some of them, including Kazakhstan and other Central Asian republics. But elections in Ukraine and Georgia were accompanied by upheavals later called "orange" or "color" revolutions, with public clashes, turbulent demonstrations, and a transfer of power to a new, less legitimate government.

When election results are contested in a former Soviet republic, the West, represented by state and supra-national democratic institutions, usually denounces the excessive use of administrative resources by the ruling party. Partly with that as a justification, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union, the administrations of the United States and EU countries, and other Western agencies invariably take the side of the force that contests the election results.

The pro-government political parties in Armenia appear to have the strongest positions now. Many believe that they will share victory in the parliamentary elections and therefore posts in the government and the leadership of the new parliament. This is quite likely because the current Armenian opposition parties are dependent on their leaders, and the general public knows very little, if anything, about their programs.

The forces that rely on Western political and social values and development paths stand apart from the other opposition parties. One of them is the party of the former speaker of parliament, Artur Bagdasaryan. Another is the movement led by Raffi Ovannisyan, former minister of foreign affairs and a U.S. national who has become an Armenian citizen.

Inspired by the example of neighboring countries, the new pro-Western forces in Armenia attend all meetings of international organizations, tirelessly proclaim their commitment to European values, and complain that Armenia is so far not up to the European mark.

European organizations give such figures a pat on the back and try to involve them in their activities. Some of these figures have earned quite a reputation, while others are staying in the shadows, and their involvement in the work of foreign organizations has so far remained unnoticed by the Armenian, let alone Russian, public.

Shavarsh Kocharyan, a deputy in the Armenian parliament, was on the Armenian delegation to PACE for several years and was removed in 2006. This, however, has not stopped him from maintaining, and possibly strengthening, his ties with that influential European body. Since leaving, Kocharyan has been invited to Strasbourg three times, attending PACE meetings on trips paid for by the organization.

The heads of the Council of Europe's observer missions at elections are traditionally appointed by one of the CE parties on a rotating basis. When the head of a mission for the Armenian elections was selected, it was the turn of the European Democrats, a party dominated by ethnic Russians. Many expected that the post would be given to a Russian, but the PACE Bureau changed the rules of the game, and the post was given to Leo Platvoet of the Netherlands.

A change in Armenia's policy, or a political destabilization of the republic, could undermine Russia's influence in the region, which largely depends on its alliance with Armenia. Therefore, Russia needs Armenia to remain stable and stick to the same policies after the parliamentary and presidential elections. It will also benefit if the forces wishing to strengthen the alliance with Russia remain at the country's helm.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

Fighting for Armenia

04/ 04/ 2007
RIA Novosti
By Alexander Mkrtchian for RIA Novosti
MOSCOW

In all civilized countries people see elections as an opportunity to improve their lives, to build a stronger state and improve security. Similar attitudes prevail in Armenia today because the outcome of the forthcoming parliamentary elections will largely determine changes in government and society, prospects for settling the Karabakh crisis, and success of the efforts to overcome the consequences of the Armenian genocide. These are major regional and international issues.

But ordinary Armenians have more faith in real power than promises. It is no accident that the public preferences are with the parties of power - the Republicans and the newly-established Prosperous Armenia Party (PAP). The opposition parties are obviously weak.

The PAP was set up with the support of the current administration and is headed by local oligarch Gagik Tsarukian. In the forthcoming presidential elections, he is unlikely to put up a serious fight against the only favorite Serzh Sarkisian. Even the name of Prosperous Armenia sounds more like a declaration. In effect, its leader is a man whose business has prospered largely due to the benevolent attitude of the current authorities.

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation deserves special mention. This party has made a great contribution to the success of the Karabakh movement; it is widely respected by the numerous Armenians who live outside the CIS, and has been trying to restore its positions in Russia and other former Soviet republics. It looks like this party will receive about 10% of the votes and have a voice in parliament. It will probably support the Republican presidential nominee Serzh Sarkisian, and a Russia-oriented strategy.

The prospects of Russian-Armenian strategic partnership are rather bleak since the modern geopolitical alignment of forces in the Caucasus does not favor Armenia and Russia. The U.S., Europe and Turkey are confidently paving the way for NATO into Central Asia through Georgia and Azerbaijan. The West has been closely watching the Caspian oil-and-gas projects and construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines, railways and highways bypassing Armenia, and may decide to stage a major geopolitical experiment in the region.

The United States and its allies want to stay in the region in the long term not only because the Caspian is rich in energy and Central Asia in strategic raw materials but also to gain control of the most important territories and communications, exert pressure on the oil-bearing Iran and eradicate Russia's traditional influence there. Regrettably, Orthodox Georgia is turning into a vehicle of implementing Western strategy and geopolitics in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Hence, fighting for Armenia will determine who controls the South Caucasus, and can exert certain influence on Asia Minor. For this reason, the West and Russia are equally interested in Robert Kocharian's successor.

For us the best choice will be Serzh Sarkisian, defense minister and secretary of the Armenian Security Council. As a government official, he has climbed the career ladder starting from the bottom, and held key positions in security-related bodies of Nagorny Karabakh and Armenia. He knows the domestic situation well and has built a good working relationship with his Russian colleagues. All these factors should contribute to the consolidation of strategic partnership.

There is no united opposition in Armenia, which does not mean that the presidential elections will be uneventful. The Western favorite is Vardan Oskanian, who has been Armenia's foreign minister during all these years.

In order to promote their strategic partnership Russia and Armenia should look for new opportunities to expand trade and economic relations, and military-technical and cultural cooperation. Armenia requires additional security guarantees in the event of an armed provocation in the Karabakh conflict area. In turn, Armenia should have a clear-cut concept of national security. Russia, on the other hand, must clearly see the framework of a common security system in the region in general, and in Armenia, in particular.

The inter-government commission on economic cooperation between Russia and Armenia should probably step up its activities. It could include reputable representatives of civil institutions from both sides.

Russian companies have bought Armenian energy facilities, and are not enthusiastic about investing in the local economy, especially in small and medium-sized businesses. By comparison, in the period between 1992 and 2001,Turkey set up 1,327 businesses of different status on the territory of its main South Caucasian partner, Azerbaijan.

Armenian society is hoping that the visit of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will contribute to the promotion of bilateral ties. Yerevan understands that the present and future of Russian-Armenian relations largely determine political stability in the South Caucasus. Despite intensive activities of NATO and the European Union in the region, Armenia continues to be Russia's reliable partner. Yerevan is maintaining relations of trust with Russia when it comes to national security, and is trying to avoid problems that may require force majeure solutions. This is my view of Armenian foreign policy. Its positive development largely depends on Russia's position, and on its predictable and resolute action in the region.

Alexander Mkrtchian is a member of the Union of Armenians in Russia board.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.