Come share our rusty, resented radar

June 19, 2007
IHT
Putin's provocation
By Thomas Goltz
LIVINGSTON, Montana:

President Vladimir Putin's suggestion to President George W. Bush at the G-8 summit that the United States relocate its missile defense system from Eastern Europe took many by surprise, not only because of Putin's apparent (and sudden) acquiescence to the neo-Star Wars program, but also because of the alternative site he proposed: Azerbaijan.

Actually, the idea is not so strange.

Azerbaijan is in many ways the most logical place to set up an early warning system, if Bush's concerns are really about the future nuclear capabilities of Iran or terrorists in the larger Middle East.

Indeed, it was in the former Soviet republic of Azerbaijan - outside the town of Gabala on the southern slopes of the eastern Caucasus Mountains - that the Soviet Union erected its own massive early-warning radar system.

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The Soviet goal then was to interdict possible nefarious action by states such as Iran, then perceived as an American proxy under the late Shah Reza Pahlavi, as well as NATO-member Turkey and, more distantly, Israel.

Although antiquated now, Gabala continues to function as Russia's eyes and ears on the Middle East, picking up spy signals, it is said, from as far away as Cairo, Oman and the Indian Ocean.

More to the point, the station is a bone of contention between Azerbaijan and Russia, as it represents the last piece of Russian military presence in Azerbaijan. Another source of friction over the station is the claim, often repeated by local media, that the radar emits radiation that causes everything from infertility to cancer.

All Russian combat units left Azerbaijan in 1993 as part of a complex deal that may or may not have been part of a coup d'état in progress at the time.

The Russian generals apparently believed they would soon be back to re-establish their traditional zone of influence, only to be resisted by the very leader they were backing.

Heidar Aliyev, a former Politburo member and KGB general, saw Azerbaijan's future with the West and declined to let the Russian military back in.

Only the Gabala radar station remained.

After Baku agreed in 2006 to extend the lease on Gabala for another decade, the Azerbaijani deputy foreign minister, Araz Azimov, almost scoffed at the notion that Moscow's military was somehow sneaking back into the country. The technology at Gabala was already antiquated, he said, and he doubted the station would still be functional in five years.

So it was less surprising that Putin offered Bush the use of Gabala, than that he invited the Americans to set up shop in Azerbaijan at all.

After breaking out of the Soviet Union in 1991, Azerbaijan fell almost immediately into internal political chaos and a losing war with neighboring Armenia over the disputed territory of Nagorno Karabakh. Appeals to the United States for support, including an offer to let the Americans use Azerbaijan as a forward base in its tense relationship with Iran, fell largely on deaf ears in Washington.

But a massive infusion of oil wealth over the past few years, and a strong-handed sort of stability established by Aliyev and carried on since his death by his son Ilham Aliyev has made Azerbaijan quite a different place than it was when the Soviet military left in 1993.

So, what is Putin's gambit all about? One explanation is that he wants to put American radar where it would be looking out of Russia, rather than in.

Another is that in "ceding" the last piece of Russian military presence in Azerbaijan to the United States, Putin means to shift the onus of a foreign presence to the Americans, and then wait for resentment to well up among the population at large.

Another is that by bringing in the Americans into a joint military installation in Gabala, Russia will have gained a binding legal presence in Azerbaijan for the first time in almost 15 years - at least until the Americans leave (or are asked to leave, as in Uzbekistan).

Thomas Goltz, a visiting scholar on Caucasus affairs at the University of Montana's Central and Southwest Asia Studies Program, is the author of "Azerbaijan Diary: A Rogue Reporter's Adventures in an Oil-Rich, War-Torn, Post-Soviet Republic."

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

Azerbaijan favors anti-missile idea

June 8, 2007
Seattle Post Intelligencer, WA
By DOUGLAS BIRCH
ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER

MOSCOW -- Officials in Azerbaijan, a nation with a questionable human rights record and huge oil reserves, on Friday welcomed Moscow's call to use a Russian-leased radar installation in their country as the cornerstone of a proposed U.S. anti-missile system.

Elmar Mammadyarov, Azerbaijan's foreign minister, said in the capital of Baku that the proposal "can only bring more stability into the region because it can lead to more predictable actions in the region."

Novruz Mamedov, head of the Azerbaijani presidential administration's international relations department, told Russia's Rossiya TV that "such cooperation can have a very strong and positive impact on the situation in the world as a whole.

"If such countries as Russia and the U.S. cooperate, they will have common interests and it will prevent tensions," he said.

For weeks, Russian President Vladimir Putin bitterly denounced the U.S. plan to build a missile interceptor base in Poland and a radar site in the Czech Republic, saying the system was aimed at Russia's strategic arsenal.

Then on Thursday, Putin caught President Bush off guard by urging that the Soviet-era radar installation at Gabala, in northeast Azerbaijan, be used instead as part of a joint U.S.-Russian missile shield. On Friday, he suggested the missile intercepter base could be in Turkey or at sea.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said Friday that Putin's idea was worth studying, but stressed that negotiations on putting the bases in eastern Europe would continue.

"One does not choose sites for missile defense out of the blue," she said in an interview with The Associated Pres. "It's geometry and geography as to how you intercept a missile."

A Russian military expert said the Gabala installation was built to track U.S. bombers and submarine-launched missiles from the Indian Ocean.

The Bush administration has said it seeks to counter future missile threats to Europe from Iran, which Washington fears is developing nuclear weapons.

Azerbaijan, a former Soviet nation of 8.5 million about the size of Maine, is on the western shore of the Caspian Sea, flanked by Russia to the north and Iran to the south. It is one of the countries in Central and South Asia that the U.S. has turned to since the Sept. 11 attacks, despite their mixed records on human rights and democracy.

The government in Baku has contributed 150 soldiers to the war in Iraq and 20 to coalition military forces in Afghanistan.

According to a Council of Europe report last year, Baku has served as a refueling stop for CIA aircraft shuttling terror suspects to secret prisons.

The country has rich oil and natural gas deposits - Baku was one of the first oil boomtowns in the 19th century. But according to government statistics, nearly one-fifth of the population lives in poverty.

Azerbaijani authorities have been criticized by rights groups and the U.S. government for their hostility to independent and opposition journalists.

Human Rights Watch says that over the past year or so, authorities have prosecuted and imprisoned seven journalists, mostly on charges of criminal libel and "insult." Journalists are also attacked and threatened with violence, the group said.

The State Department's human rights report for 2006 said the Azerbaijani government engages in the arbitrary arrest and detention of political opponents.

The country is also the site of one of the "frozen conflicts" left over from the post-Soviet era. Azerbaijan and Armenia are at odds over Nagorno-Karabakh, a region that is inside Azerbaijan but has been controlled by ethnic Armenian forces since a 1994 cease-fire ended a six-year war.

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Associated Press writer Maria Danilova contributed to this story.

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

Caucasus: Russian Radar Proposal Could Upset Region

June 8, 2007
RFE/RL
By Jeffrey Donovan

In geopolitics, particularly in a place as strategically important as the South Caucasus, even the smallest shift can unleash major consequences.

What would the impact be on that volatile region -- a crossroads for the competing interests of Russia, the United States, and Iran -- if Washington accepted Russian President Vladimir Putin's offer to jointly use a Russian-leased radar base in Azerbaijan as part of an antimissile shield?

In a word: profound.

After all, Azerbaijan and Armenia, which fought a war in the early 1990s, are still locked in a bitter dispute. And Iran, meanwhile, is unlikely to view favorably more U.S. military moves on its border. Iranian state radio said today that Putin's proposal could have "serious regional implications in the domain of security."

Radio Farda acting Director Mosaddegh Katouzian notes that Tehran and Baku's good relations could be affected, and that the issue is likely to be discussed in two weeks during Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad's scheduled visit to Baku

"Definitely Iran would be concerned about having those types of bases in Azerbaijan because of its own security," Katouzian says. "So probably in the next talks between President Mahmud Ahmadinejad and Baku officials, this is going to come up as a big concern."

Frozen Conflict

Then there's Armenia and Azerbaijan, who fought a war in 1991-94 in which 25,000 died. They have since been locked in a bitter dispute over the object of that conflict: Azerbaijan's predominantly ethnic-Armenian-populated region of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Ironically, Putin's offer comes as Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian President Robert Kocharian, himself a former Karabakh leader, are to meet in St. Petersburg on June 9 to discuss the standoff over the enclave.

International mediators have hoped that the two presidents can agree on small steps to improve life for people in Nagorno-Karabakh. But they also fear if dialogue fails, violence could resume, destabilizing an area that is emerging as a key energy producer and transport route between the Caspian Sea region and Europe.

Putin's missile-defense proposal, however, appears to risk tipping the balancing act on Nagorno-Karabakh toward Azerbaijan.

Upsetting Regional Balance

Rasim Musabekov, a political analyst based in Baku, suggests Azerbaijan could parlay any pivotal role in Washington's missile-defense shield into obtaining concessions from Armenian in the standoff over Nagorno-Karabakh.

"The discussion of this issue alone is raising Azerbaijan's strategic importance. This is a win for Azerbaijan. If we are taken as partners of the United States of America and Russia, this would give us certain security guarantees and would lead to obligations [on the part of Russia and the United States] to settle problems that Azerbaijan is concerned about," Musabekov says.

Click image to enlarge"In the first place, this means restoring Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, which was violated by Armenian aggression against 20 percent of Azerbaijan's territory," he adds.

So far, Azerbaijani authorities have refrained from offering a full reaction to Russia's proposal.

However, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov has told RFE/RL's Azerbaijani Service that Baku is ready to negotiate "bilaterally, or we can do it in the trilateral format" with the United States and Russia, which currently leases the radar base from Azerbaijan.

Armenia, meanwhile, would appear to be concerned about that prospect.

Armenian Foreign Ministry spokesman Vladimir Karapetian tells RFE/RL that both Russia and the United States should "take into account the balance of the power in the region before making such a decision."

Armenia Nervous

But for weeks now, even before Putin made his surprise proposal at the Group of Eight (G8) summit in Germany, that balance has already appeared to be tilting away from Armenia.

Yerevan is traditionally a close ally of Russia. But Harry Tamrazian, head of RFE/RL's Armenian Service, says that in recent weeks there's been a flood of Russian officials visiting Baku, including a visit by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.

"Now, it appears that [the] Russians are talking to [the] Azeris. Russian high-level officials are frequently in Baku. You can see them almost every week in Baku, talking to Azeri leaders," he says. "And this makes Armenian leaders nervous. Obviously, there is a clear rapprochement between Moscow and Baku."

Together with France, the United States and Russia are co-chairs of the Minsk Group, the body set up by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to seek solutions to the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis.

Yerevan's chief concern now, says Tamrazian, is that if Russia and U.S. interests converge in Baku, Armenia could pay the price.

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.

RUSSIA MOVES TO REPAIR TIES WITH AZERBAIJAN

4/02/07
EurasiaNet
Sergei Blagov

Russian leader Vladimir Putin is intent on reducing tension with Azerbaijan, one of the Caspian Basin’s key energy producers.

During and informal get-together March 27 in Moscow, Putin was unusually solicitous toward Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. "I am grateful to the president of Azerbaijan for using any opportunity for meeting," the Itar-Tass news agency quoted Putin as saying. Putin went on to say that Aliyev "always was a welcome guest."

Putin’s charm offensive is linked to geopolitics and Russia’s unstinting efforts to maintain its commanding Caspian Basin energy position. Starting in late 2006, Azerbaijani-Russian relations took a nosedive after the Kremlin-controlled conglomerate, Gazprom, attempted to dramatically raise the price of natural gas exports to Azerbaijan. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. At the time, Aliyev essentially told Russia to take a hike, saying that Azerbaijan would not tolerate "commercial blackmail."

Most former Soviet states are energy-dependent on Russia, and thus have little leverage in pricing negotiations with Russian energy suppliers. Not Azerbaijan, which is projected to more than double its oil production over the next three years, from 237 million barrels to 476 million barrels, according to a report published by the Moscow Times. Baku is also expecting to significantly increase in gas production over the same period.

The Aliyev administration reacted to the Gazprom move by declaring that Azerbaijan would cease importing Russian gas, and suspend oil exports via Russian pipelines. Baku’s action got the Kremlin’s attention. Increasing the pressure on Russia to make amends was Azerbaijan’s zealous efforts to establish good relations with Turkmenistan, which, if successful, could pave the way for a trans-Caspian gas pipeline. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. That potential export route would break Russia’s stranglehold over Central Asian gas exports, potentially dealing a severe blow to the Kremlin’s energy policy. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Details of the March 27 discussions between Aliyev and Putin proved elusive, but the two appeared to ease the bilateral chill. Putin invited Aliyev to attend St. Petersburg’s 11th International Economic Forum and an informal CIS summit this June. In response, Aliyev said Baku was ready to discuss bilateral issues. He added that the two countries enjoyed "stable, friendly and cooperative relations," and indicated that he would attend the events in St. Petersburg. The Azerbaijani news agency APA, quoted Aliyev as saying the two presidents had a "fruitful exchange."

Strategic considerations perhaps prompted Aliyev to mend fences with Moscow. Azerbaijan has in recent months sought to bolster support for its negotiating position in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace talks. A settlement has eluded Azerbaijan and Armenia in the long-running negotiations. Nevertheless, international mediators hope that a breakthrough can be achieved in 2007. Aliyev and members of his administration insist that any settlement must leave the disputed territory under Azerbaijani control. Armenian leaders are equally adamant that a peace deal leave Karabakh independent of Baku.

During a March 28 visit to Baku, Russia’s Federation Council Speaker, Sergei Mironov, characterized the lack of a Karabakh settlement as a "wound that does not heal." In comments broadcast on Azerbaijani television, he went on to express confidence that "Russia will do its best to help resolve the issue as soon as possible."

In Baku, Mironov also discussed economic issues with Parliament Speaker Ogtay Asadov and Prime Minister Artur Rasizade. "Our positions on international problems coincide," Mironov said, noting that bilateral trade turnover experienced a surge in 2006 and stood at over $1.5 billion for the year. Russia runs a healthy trade surplus with Azerbaijan.

Russian officials have moved to reassure Baku over a new law that went into effect April 1 that imposes a ban on foreign citizens from selling goods at markets in Russia. Mironov announced during a March 28 news conference that the legislation would not impact the large number of Azeris in Russia, many of whom sell produce and other goods at market across Russia. "Nothing will change in the lives of Azerbaijanis in Russia," Mironov insisted.


Editor’s Note: Sergei Blagov is a Moscow-based specialist in CIS political affairs.

Posted April 2, 2007 © Eurasianet
http://www.eurasianet.org

Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.