The real struggle is inside Turkey, not on its borders
Friday June 15, 2007
The Guardian
By Jonathan Steele in Istanbul
The issue is not between Islam and modernity, but whether secularists can end their reliance on class prejudice and fantasy
Turkey is big on flags, both in the mind and in the air. Huge, blood-red rectangles flap from tall masts on various points along the Bosphorus, almost as ugly as wind-power turbines. One of the latest to sprout up, and dominate a lovely wooded hillside, is in the chic suburb of Istinye, with its yachting harbour and luxury flats.
Like other municipalities in Istanbul, with its rapidly expanding population of migrants from Anatolia, Istinye's council has come into the hands of the AKP, Turkey's Islamist party, which also runs the national government. "The AKP is always on probation. Every day they have to prove themselves," says Emel Kurma, the executive director of the civil society organisation, the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly (Turkey). She speaks of the AKP's plight with some sympathy. When they came to power five years ago, the Islamists had to prove they were democrats who would respect the country's rigidly secular constitution.
In recent months a new testing ground has emerged - nationalism. Are the Islamists loyal Turks? Hence that grotesque flag in Istinye and, far more menacingly, the current sabre-rattling over whether to invade northern Iraq. The purpose would be to try to stamp out the secessionist Kurdish guerrilla group, the PKK, which uses bases in the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan.
The army has been itching to have a go. The government has been hesitating. With national elections due in a month's time, some analysts believe the issue is shadow-boxing. The army sees itself as the ultimate guardian of Turkey's secular traditions and may - in cahoots with the main opposition party - be trying to portray the Islamists as weak and unpatriotic. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has so far resisted, this week bravely saying that for every PKK guerrilla in Iraq, there are 10 inside Turkey. The battle has to be fought in Turkey, not across the border.
Turkey's bout of nationalism is partly fuelled by irritation over constant slaps in the face from the EU. Nicolas Sarkozy's outright rejection of - and Angela Merkel's scepticism about - Turkey's claim to be a member are factors. Another is anti-Americanism - found, paradoxically, more frequently within the army leadership and the secularists than among the Islamists. When the AKP nominated foreign minister Abdullah Gul to be the next president, some demonstrators punned on the Turkish initials for USA. "We want no ABD-ullah as president," they shouted.
The slight rise in nationalism is only one element in a more significant struggle. It was graphically illustrated by the vast demonstrations held in four cities this spring, the biggest outpouring of popular feeling in Turkey for generations. Hundreds of thousands marched against the Islamists, calling for Turkey to be saved from their rule.
The trigger was that decision by the AKP to nominate one of their number to be president. At first glance it might seem an odd issue to be worked up about since the AKP has been in power for five years - during which the country has enjoyed phenomenal economic growth and the government, with an eye to EU membership, has made a series of changes to the penal and civil codes which enhance rather than diminish women's rights.
But in Turkey the president is the gatekeeper. He has the right of veto over legislation and makes key appointments in the judiciary and the education system. With an AKP man as president and another as prime minister, some fear the last door to sweeping change would open.
The throngs who marched through Ankara, Istabul and other cities were worried that the Islamists might bring in sharia law or reverse Turkey's ban on headscarves in schools, universities and government offices. They might even make it go the other way. Instead of no woman being allowed to wear one, the rule would be that every woman must wear one. Gul's wife wears a headscarf and Turkey's secularists could not stomach the idea of their first lady in one.
Binnaz Toprak, a professor of political science at Istanbul's prestigious Bilgi university, has made several studies of public attitudes that give the lie to the secularists' fears. The number of Turks who want an Islamic state fell from an already low 20% in 1999 to 9% last year. The percentage of women who cover their hair when they go into the street has also dropped, from 74% in 1999 to 64% last year. It is a reality that is easily visible, even in conservative suburbs of Istanbul like Uskudari, where mothers in headscarves can be seen strolling along with teenage daughters with black or tinted hair, uncovered and free.
Professor Toprak sees a positive side to the protests. "They represented civil society. It shows people aren't just leaving things to the military," she argues. The army leadership issued two statements about alleged threats to the state, "but it was almost as though they wanted to show they were still in charge".
The downside of the demonstrations is that they may reinforce a false image of Turkey as a country divided between Islamists and democrats. In fact the secularists tend to be more narrow and nationalist, and certainly more elitist, than the AKP. The protesters were mainly middle and upper class, and had a strong element of anti-immigrant prejudice about them. Here was a once-ruling group which resents the arrival of peasants in town, and the fact that they have the strength to win elections.
The symbolism matters as much as the substance, since the AKP has done nothing to disturb Turkey's secular institutions. Mustafa Akyol, a young Islamist newspaper columnist, attacks "secular fundamentalism" and the way its adherents define a "secular republic" as a republic for secular people rather than a republic for all citizens.
The other mistake is to cast the issue as a struggle between Islam and modernity. The AKP has helped to break numerous taboos, from the Kurdish issue to the Armenian one. It is more European and globalising than the old elite. The real issue in Turkey is whether Kemalism - the doctrine of Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the secular republic is known - can be modernised. Can the country's secularists build a progressive and open-minded political party again, and thereby find a way of contesting with the Islamists that does not rely on class prejudice, manipulating fantasies about Islamisation, and reliance on the army to knock over the chess table as a last resort?
j.steele@guardian.co.uk
Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.
The Guardian
By Jonathan Steele in Istanbul
The issue is not between Islam and modernity, but whether secularists can end their reliance on class prejudice and fantasy
Turkey is big on flags, both in the mind and in the air. Huge, blood-red rectangles flap from tall masts on various points along the Bosphorus, almost as ugly as wind-power turbines. One of the latest to sprout up, and dominate a lovely wooded hillside, is in the chic suburb of Istinye, with its yachting harbour and luxury flats.
Like other municipalities in Istanbul, with its rapidly expanding population of migrants from Anatolia, Istinye's council has come into the hands of the AKP, Turkey's Islamist party, which also runs the national government. "The AKP is always on probation. Every day they have to prove themselves," says Emel Kurma, the executive director of the civil society organisation, the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly (Turkey). She speaks of the AKP's plight with some sympathy. When they came to power five years ago, the Islamists had to prove they were democrats who would respect the country's rigidly secular constitution.
In recent months a new testing ground has emerged - nationalism. Are the Islamists loyal Turks? Hence that grotesque flag in Istinye and, far more menacingly, the current sabre-rattling over whether to invade northern Iraq. The purpose would be to try to stamp out the secessionist Kurdish guerrilla group, the PKK, which uses bases in the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan.
The army has been itching to have a go. The government has been hesitating. With national elections due in a month's time, some analysts believe the issue is shadow-boxing. The army sees itself as the ultimate guardian of Turkey's secular traditions and may - in cahoots with the main opposition party - be trying to portray the Islamists as weak and unpatriotic. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has so far resisted, this week bravely saying that for every PKK guerrilla in Iraq, there are 10 inside Turkey. The battle has to be fought in Turkey, not across the border.
Turkey's bout of nationalism is partly fuelled by irritation over constant slaps in the face from the EU. Nicolas Sarkozy's outright rejection of - and Angela Merkel's scepticism about - Turkey's claim to be a member are factors. Another is anti-Americanism - found, paradoxically, more frequently within the army leadership and the secularists than among the Islamists. When the AKP nominated foreign minister Abdullah Gul to be the next president, some demonstrators punned on the Turkish initials for USA. "We want no ABD-ullah as president," they shouted.
The slight rise in nationalism is only one element in a more significant struggle. It was graphically illustrated by the vast demonstrations held in four cities this spring, the biggest outpouring of popular feeling in Turkey for generations. Hundreds of thousands marched against the Islamists, calling for Turkey to be saved from their rule.
The trigger was that decision by the AKP to nominate one of their number to be president. At first glance it might seem an odd issue to be worked up about since the AKP has been in power for five years - during which the country has enjoyed phenomenal economic growth and the government, with an eye to EU membership, has made a series of changes to the penal and civil codes which enhance rather than diminish women's rights.
But in Turkey the president is the gatekeeper. He has the right of veto over legislation and makes key appointments in the judiciary and the education system. With an AKP man as president and another as prime minister, some fear the last door to sweeping change would open.
The throngs who marched through Ankara, Istabul and other cities were worried that the Islamists might bring in sharia law or reverse Turkey's ban on headscarves in schools, universities and government offices. They might even make it go the other way. Instead of no woman being allowed to wear one, the rule would be that every woman must wear one. Gul's wife wears a headscarf and Turkey's secularists could not stomach the idea of their first lady in one.
Binnaz Toprak, a professor of political science at Istanbul's prestigious Bilgi university, has made several studies of public attitudes that give the lie to the secularists' fears. The number of Turks who want an Islamic state fell from an already low 20% in 1999 to 9% last year. The percentage of women who cover their hair when they go into the street has also dropped, from 74% in 1999 to 64% last year. It is a reality that is easily visible, even in conservative suburbs of Istanbul like Uskudari, where mothers in headscarves can be seen strolling along with teenage daughters with black or tinted hair, uncovered and free.
Professor Toprak sees a positive side to the protests. "They represented civil society. It shows people aren't just leaving things to the military," she argues. The army leadership issued two statements about alleged threats to the state, "but it was almost as though they wanted to show they were still in charge".
The downside of the demonstrations is that they may reinforce a false image of Turkey as a country divided between Islamists and democrats. In fact the secularists tend to be more narrow and nationalist, and certainly more elitist, than the AKP. The protesters were mainly middle and upper class, and had a strong element of anti-immigrant prejudice about them. Here was a once-ruling group which resents the arrival of peasants in town, and the fact that they have the strength to win elections.
The symbolism matters as much as the substance, since the AKP has done nothing to disturb Turkey's secular institutions. Mustafa Akyol, a young Islamist newspaper columnist, attacks "secular fundamentalism" and the way its adherents define a "secular republic" as a republic for secular people rather than a republic for all citizens.
The other mistake is to cast the issue as a struggle between Islam and modernity. The AKP has helped to break numerous taboos, from the Kurdish issue to the Armenian one. It is more European and globalising than the old elite. The real issue in Turkey is whether Kemalism - the doctrine of Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the secular republic is known - can be modernised. Can the country's secularists build a progressive and open-minded political party again, and thereby find a way of contesting with the Islamists that does not rely on class prejudice, manipulating fantasies about Islamisation, and reliance on the army to knock over the chess table as a last resort?
j.steele@guardian.co.uk
Note: Above are excerpts from the article. The full article appears here. Clarifications and comments by me are contained in {}. Deletions are marked by [...]. The bold emphasis is mine.
Labels: Turkey - Politics
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